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The effect of foreign-owned large plant closures  
on nearby firms 
Márta Bisztray 
Abstract  
I estimate the impact of foreign-owned large plant closures on local firms. I identify 41 such 
events in Hungary and assign comparable control cities with foreign-owned large plants 
operating in the same industry and not closing. I use a firm-level panel database of 
Hungarian firms between 1992 and 2012. I do a difference-in-differences estimation 
comparing outcomes of firms in the treated and control areas, before and after the plant 
closure. I find that after the foreign-owned large plant closures sales of nearby firms 
decreased by 6 percentage points and employment decreased by 3 percentage points on 
average. Firms operating in local services were hurt even more, suggesting that reduced local 
purchasing power due to the layoffs is a significant channel of the local plant closure effect. 
Firms operating in the supplier industry of the closing plant also decreased employment 
more than average, suggesting that input-output linkages play an important role in the 
propagation of negative shocks. In contrast, firms in the industry of the closing plant 
increased their employment, suggesting that they could benefit from the increased local labor 
supply. I also find that low-productivity firms were hurt more by the plant closures than 
high-productivity firms. 
JEL: F23, R12, R23, R58 
Keywords: plant closure, agglomeration, local labor market, demand effect, input-output 
links, propagation of shocks, FDI. 
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Hogyan hat a külföldi tulajdonban lévő gyárak bezárása  
a helyi vállalatokra? 
Bisztray Márta 
Összefoglaló  
Tanulmányomban a külföldi tulajdonban lévő nagy gyárak bezárásának helyi cégekre 
gyakorolt hatását elemzem 41 magyarországi gyárbezárást vizsgálva. Minden eseményhez 
hozzárendelek egy hasonló kontroll települést, ahol a vizsgált bezárás idején egy olyan 
külföldi tulajdonban lévő, azonos iparágban működő nagy gyár volt, amely nem zárt be. Az 
elemzésekhez cég szintű panel adatbázist használok, mely 1992 és 2012 között tartalmaz 
adatokat magyar cégekről. A különbségek közti különbségek módszerét alkalmazva a 
gyárbezárás által érintett és a kontroll településeken lévő cégek teljesítményét hasonlítom 
össze a bezárás időpontja előtt és után. A gyárbezárás után a környező cégek értékesítése 
átlagosan 6 százalékponttal csökkent, a foglalkoztatásuk pedig átlagosan 3 százalékponttal 
lett alacsonyabb. A helyi szolgáltató ágazatban működő cégek esetén az átlagosnál nagyobb 
volt a visszaesés. Ez arra utal, hogy az elbocsátottak csökkenő vásárlóereje jelentősen 
hozzájárul a gyárbezárás helyi gazdaságra gyakorolt negatív hatásához. A bezáró gyár 
beszállító iparágában működő cégek esetén szintén az átlagosnál nagyobb a becsült hatás, 
ami azt sugallja, hogy a cégek közti input-output kapcsolatok fontos szerepet töltenek be a 
külső gazdasági hatások helyi tovagyűrűzésében. Ugyanakkor a bezáró gyár iparágában 
működő cégek növelni tudták a foglalkoztatásukat. A megnövekedett helyi munkaerő kínálat 
miatt számukra előnyös volt a gyárbezárás. A közgazdasági intuíciónak megfelelően az 
alacsony termelékenységű cégek esetén erősebb negatív hatást becsülök, mint a magasabb 
termelékenységű cégeknél.  
JEL: F23, R12, R23, R58 
 
Tárgyszavak: gyárbezárás, agglomeráció, helyi munkaerőpiac, keresleti hatás, input-
output kapcsolatok, külső hatások tovagyűrűzése, külföldi működőtőke-beruházás. 
 
 
The effect of foreign-owned large plant closures on nearby firms
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Abstract
I estimate the impact of foreign-owned large plant closures on local firms. I identify 41 such
events in Hungary and assign comparable control cities with foreign-owned large plants oper-
ating in the same industry and not closing. I use a firm-level panel database of Hungarian
firms between 1992-2012. I do a difference-in-differences estimation comparing outcomes of
firms in the treated and control areas, before and after the plant closure. I find that after the
foreign-owned large plant closures sales of nearby firms decreased by 6 percentage points and
employment decreased by 3 percentage points on average. Firms operating in local services
were hurt even more, suggesting that reduced local purchasing power due to the layoffs is a
significant channel of the local plant closure effect. Firms operating in the supplier industry of
the closing plant also decreased employment more than average, suggesting that input-output
linkages play an important role in the propagation of negative shocks. In contrast, firms in the
industry of the closing plant increased their employment, suggesting that they could benefit
from the increased local labor supply. I also find that low-productivity firms were hurt more
by the plant closures than high-productivity firms.
I Introduction
Local spillover effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) is a widely researched topic.1 Attracting FDI
is an important goal of economic policy in many countries all over the world.2 Some of these investments
is, however, reverted within a few years, resulting in the relocation of production and plant closures. We
know that mass layoffs and plant closures happen rather frequently.3 Moreover, foreign-owned firms and
especially multinationals tend to be more footloose than domestic firms.4 In this paper I look at a much less
∗I am very grateful to A´da´m Szeidl and Miklo´s Koren for their guidance throughout the whole project and to Christian
Fons-Rosen and Sergey Lychagin for their useful insights. I also thank the audiences at the CEU PhD workshop, at the
annual conference of the Hungarian Society of Economics, at the IE-CERS research seminar and at the SMYE 2015 conference
for helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Lendu¨let Grant ’Firms, Strategy and Performance’ of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
1See for example Javorcik (2004), Kneller and Pisu (2007), Crespo and Fontoura (2007), Smeets (2008), Meyer and Sinani
(2009).
2e.g. http://www.cbi.org.uk/media-centre/news-articles/2012/09/how-the-us-china-and-india-try-to-attract-\
\external-investment/.
3According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, in the first quarter of 2013 there were 914 mass layoff events in the US
with about 154 thousand people being laid off (http://www.bls.gov/mls/). Before the crisis, in the period of 2000-2007 there
were around 123,000 mass layoff events with altogether more than 13.7 million people being laid off (http://www.bls.gov/mls/
mlspnfmle.htm).
4See for example Alvarez and Go¨rg (2009), Bernard and Sjo¨holm (2003), Bernard and Jensen (2007), Kneller et al. (2012)
and van Beveren (2007).
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investigated aspect of the FDI effect: the impact on the local economy when FDI leaves. As attracting or
keeping existing FDI needs different policy measures, findings about the effect of FDI exits are also relevant
from a policy perspective.
My contribution is threefold: first, existing papers related to this topic either investigate the consequences
of mass layoffs on individuals losing their jobs (e.g. Browning and Heinesen, 2012 and Eliason-Storrie, 2006),
or look at the effects of large plant closures and mass layoffs on the local labor market (e.g. Gathmann et
al., 2015, Jofre-Monseny et al., 2015 and Foote et al., 2015) or on subsequent exits (e.g. Ferragina et al.,
2012 and Resende et al., 2013). In this paper I look at the effect of foreign-owned large plant closures on
various aspects of local firms’ performance, including sales, employment, productivity and survival. Second,
by looking at the heterogeneity of the effect across firms, I provide some evidence about the various channels
through which foreign-owned large plant closures affect local firms: increased labor supply, decreased demand
due to lower purchasing power of unemployed local consumers and lost input-output linkages. Third, the
main focus of the existing literature is either the USA and Western Europe (e.g. Gathmann et al., 2015)
or the developing world (e.g. Bernard and Sjo¨holm, 2003). Using Hungarian data, this paper looks at a
different setting in a middle-income country.
I use press announcements from the period 1998-2009 to identify 41 cases in Hungary where a foreign-
owned large plant closed and did not reopen. These are typically subsidiaries of a multinational enterprise,
and can either be greenfield investments or previous foreign acquisitions. I identify nearby firms using a
panel database5 of firms operating in Hungary between 1992-2012. With a difference-in-differences strategy
I compare the performance of local firms within 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant and in a comparable
control area, before and after the plant closure. I assign control locations using propensity score matching.
I choose the controls from those cities which had a large foreign-owned plant operating in the same 2-digit
industry as the closing plant and the plant in the potential control city was still active three years after the
closure event.
The identification assumption I use is the exogeneity of the observed plant closures, such that plants did
not close because of worsening local conditions. The assumption is supported by three types of evidence: first,
the literature finds that foreign multinationals are more likely to relocate independently of local conditions or
plant performance than domestic firms (e.g. Bernard and Sjo¨holm, 2003, Bernard and Jensen, 2007, Alvarez
and Go¨rg, 2009, Ferragina et al., 2012 and Engel et al., 2013). Second, the press announcements about the
reason for the plant closure either mentioned global reasons (e.g. decreasing demand) or country-specific
reasons (e.g. high labor costs). Using control locations in the identification accounts for any country-wide
or global changes. Third, I find that on average outcomes of firms in treated and control locations are not
significantly different before the plant closure. Additionally, my main findings are robust to controlling for
potential differences in pre-closure trends of the two firm groups.
Considering closures of foreign-owned plants has the advantage that local conditions are less likely to
affect the decision to close than for domestic plants. Still, my results might not be specific to foreign-owned
5The data set I use: ”APEH Balance Sheet” is created by the Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional
Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA KRTK) from the original data. The data set is work in progress. Although the
MTA KRTK made effort to clean the data, it cannot be held liable for any remaining error.
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large closures. In the current paper I do not deal with the question of external validity to domestic plant
closures. As the decision about exit might be less correlated with location-specific conditions than the
location decision at entry, my results can also be used to give a lower-bound estimate for the effect of an
FDI entry. Nevertheless, I expect the true effect of entry to be higher, as transferred knowledge or new
infrastructure remains still after the FDI exit.
Looking at a three-year period after a plant closure, I find that the sales of firms within the 10 km
agglomeration of a closing plant decreased by 6 percentage points, and their employment decreased by 3
percentage points on average. I still find significantly lower sales and employment 4-5 years after the closures.
At the same time, there is no significant effect on productivity, average wage or exit probability. Results are
robust to specification changes in which I account for potential differences in the pre-closure trend of firms
in treated and control locations. The estimated effects are heterogeneous across firms. Foreign-owned and
large firms seem to benefit, and small and low-productivity firms lose more than average in terms of sales
or employment. Effects are also heterogeneous by the characteristics of the local economy. Local firms are
more affected in smaller cities and in regions with a high unemployment rate.
I also show some evidence suggesting the importance of three different channels in the plant closure effect.
First, local labor supply increases for the remaining local firms after a plant closure, exerting a downward
pressure on wages. Former employees of the foreign firm might also transfer valuable knowledge to their
new firm.6 Especially those firms can benefit, which employ people with similar education and skills as
the closing plant. Indeed, I find that firms operating in the same industry as the closing plant increased
their employment and had a lower exit probability after the closure. Second, when the laid-off people stay
unemployed or can only find a job paying less, their consumption will decrease due to the lost income,
hurting firms which sell to local consumers. In line with Mian and Sufi (2012), I find that firms providing
non-tradable local services decreased their employment more than average after the closure. Third, lost
input-output linkages can hurt local buyers or suppliers, as it can be costly to find new business partners
and transport cost might also increase. I find that firms operating in the local supplier industry of the closing
plant decreased their employment more than average after the closure. Buyers were not affected significantly,
which can be the result of closing plants having not many local buyers. This explanation is also supported
by the large export share of the closing plants.
I.A Related literature
This topic is closely related to the literature on how plant closures affect other firms in the agglomeration or
in the same industry. Resende et al. (2013) claim that exits induce more exits but also entries. Bernard and
Jensen (2007) point out the importance of plant closures in forming industry productivity and employment.
Here I focus on foreign-owned large plants, which makes the identification strategy more reliable due to the
exogenous exit assumption. Additionally, magnitude of the effects might be different compared to a domestic
plant closure, due to potentially higher knowledge spillovers.
6Stoyanov and Zubanov (2011) find that a new employee coming from a more productive firm increases the employer firm’s
productivity, also when looking at medium-skilled workers.
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There are two recent papers highly related to this paper, but focusing on local labor market effects. Both
papers use a similar approach to mine, doing a difference-in-difference analysis around the large layoffs with
matched control settlements. Gathmann et al. (2015) investigate the spillover effect of domestic and foreign
plant closures and mass layoffs in the local labor market. Using German data, they find that the overall
negative employment effect within the region is larger than the size of the initial layoff, but as opposed
to my results, especially same-sector firms are hurt. They also find that people moving across locations
decrease the effect of a plant closure on individual employment. On the contrary, I see no increases in the
aggregate move-out rates after a plant closure. This might be the result of the lower mobility in Hungary
compared to Germany. Jofre-Monseny et al. (2015) use the same identifying assumption as this paper. They
investigate the effect of large plant closures by looking at plants relocating abroad. Using Spanish data they
find that a considerable share of the laid-off gets employed by incumbents operating in the same industry as
the relocating plant, decreasing the actual labor losses of plant closures. This is in line with my finding on
same-industry firms increasing their employment after the closure. As opposed to my results on local service
or supplier-industry firms, they find no employment effect in other industries. In contrast with both papers,
I look at firm-level outcomes instead of aggregate industry measures. I also look at performance measures
other than employment, like sales, productivity and exit probability. Finally, as an additional contribution, I
use variation by industry to provide some suggestive evidence for the existence of different channels through
which a foreign-owned large plant closure has an effect on the local economy.
My analysis on the differential effect of plant closures in related industries can be linked to the literature
investigating the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks. Allcott et al. (2015) investigate
how shortages in electricity supply affect Indian manufacturing firms using electricity. They find significant
reductions in revenues but not in productivity. Instead of looking at a single supplier-buyer relation, Ace-
moglu et al. (2015) consider the full input-output network. They find that both the input-output network
and the geographic network play an important role in the propagation of industry-level shocks. There are
two papers using data on exact buyer-supplier relations between firms. Carvalho et al. (2014) take the Great
East Japan Earthquake as an exogenous shock and investigate how its effect propagates through inter-firm
transactions to areas unaffected by the tsunami. Looking at the exiting firms in the tsunami-hit areas, they
find a significantly negative effect on sales growth for both the suppliers and buyers of these firms. Simi-
larly, Barrot and Sauvagnat (2015) investigate firm-level idiosyncratic shocks by looking at natural disasters.
They find a negative effect on the customers of the affected firms, which spills over to their other suppliers,
originally not affected by the shock. In line with these findings, in this paper I show that firms in the
supplier industry of the closing plant are hurt more than average after the plant closure. If foreign-owned
large plant closures can be regarded as exogenous shocks in the local economy, my findings can serve as a
further evidence for the role of input-output linkages in the propagation of local shocks.
The study is structured as follows: section II gives a brief outline of the history of FDI entry and exit
in Hungary, and section III presents the data. Section IV describes the cases of exit and the process of
matching controls and section V presents the empirical strategy. Section VI shows the results and finally,
section VII concludes.
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II FDI in Hungary
Antalo´czy et al. (2011) and Antalo´czy-Sass (2005) give a nice overview of the evolution of foreign direct
investment in Hungary. This country was the first in the region opening up for FDI. After the transition
foreign investments played a crucial role in the economic development, and they remained important ever
since. Beyond greenfield investments almost all of the large Hungarian firms were privatized. At the same
time, FDI is still not embedded enough into the domestic economy. Foreign firms have relatively few local
buyers or suppliers. Foreign investment is spatially concentrated. The most popular location are the central
part of the country, especially Budapest and its agglomeration, and Central and Northern Transdanubia.
Pinte´r (2008) notes that Budapest was mostly chosen by the tertiary sector, and manufacturing firms located
their plants in other parts of the country. FDI is also concentrated in specific industries: electronics, vehicle
manufacturing and oil extraction and processing were the most popular ones in the 90s. At the same time,
there were also many cases when foreign investments exited Hungary (e.g. Kukely, 2008). Especially the
county of Vas was affected, but foreign-owned large plant closures occurred all over the country. Many of
these happened around the EU accession, since the easily accessible borders reduced cross-country transport
costs. As a result, companies could optimize production costs by concentrating their activity in fewer sites
within the region. Food, textile and the electronic industry were affected the most. Demand fluctuations,
the attractiveness of cheaper labor in Asia and global reorganizations within the company were the main
driving forces behind plant closures in the electronics industry. All in all, the high number of FDI entries
and exits in the 90’s and in the 2000’s ensure that Hungary is a good setting for investigating the effects of
foreign-owned large plant closures.
III Data
In this paper I use four types of data sources: press announcements to find closing plants, city-level
data to match control locations, industry-level data to determine industry linkages, and firm-level data to
investigate the effect of foreign-owned large plant closures on local firms. I find the press announcements
on closures by searching the web. The city-level data I use are from the freely accessible T-Star database of
the Hungarian Central Statistical Office.7 I use data on working-age population, unemployment and people
moving out of the city. I measure working-age population as the number of inhabitants aged 18-59. In order
to make the other measures comparable across locations, I always normalize with the number of working-age
population. City-level data are available for the period 2000-2013. For the propensity score matching I
need to proxy missing data before 2000. For population, I use the earliest available data from 2000. For
unemployment rate, I use NUTS-2 unemployment rate data, which are also available for the 90’s. I also have
the GPS coordinates of all the Hungarian settlements and use this information to determine the distance of
settlement pairs.
For the main analysis I use a firm-level panel dataset from the Hungarian Tax Authority (NAV), covering
7The data are accessible at the webpage http://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/themeSelector.jsp?page=2&szst=T.
5
the period 1992-2013. The dataset contains all double book-keeping firms in Hungary with yearly information
on balance sheet data, industry, foreign ownership share and location of the headquarter. I adjust all the
balance sheet data expressed in monetary values for inflation.8 Industry categories are provided following
the 2-digit NACE Rev 1.1 categorization. I determine industry links using the Hungarian input-output table
from 2005, which uses a 2-digit NACE Rev 1.1 classification. I define supplier and buyer industries in the
following way: industry j is a supplier industry of industry i if j is different from i, and j provides at least
5% of all the industrial inputs used by i. Industry k is a buyer industry of i if k is different from i, and i
provides at least 5% of all the industrial inputs used by k. For the calculations I use all industries and not
just manufacturing. The list of buyer and supplier industries, separately for each 2-digit industry in which
I have a closing plant can be found in Table A6-A9 of the Appendix.
I calculate two productivity measures from the balance sheet data. The first measure is labor productivity,
defined as value added over the number of employees. I calculate value added by deducting material cost
from the sum of sales and the capitalized value of self-manufactured assets. The second measure is total
factor productivity (TFP), which I estimate assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with coefficients
varying by two-digit industries. For firm i in industry j in year t the production function is
Yijt = Aijt + αjLijt + βjKijt + γjMijt, (1)
where Y denotes sales, A is total factor productivity, L is labor measured by the number of employees, K
is capital and M is material. I use the method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for estimating TFP.
Finally, I use an additional firm-level database from Complex to calculate the age of a firm in a given
year. I provide descriptive statistics of the variables I use in Table A11 of the Appendix.
IV The closure events and the matched controls
IV.A The cases of foreign-owned plant closures
In the current analysis I identify foreign-owned large plant closures using press announcements. Focusing
on manufacturing plants I collect 49 such events which fulfill the following criteria: 1. the closing plant
should have majority foreign ownership. 2. It has to be large enough, i.e. having more than 150 employees
at the site in the last year of operation. This ensures that the presence of the plant was important enough
for the local economy. 3. The site should not be in Budapest. I expect that the impact of a closure cannot
be so strong in the capital city as elsewhere with less employment opportunities. 4. Closure should fall
within the period of 1995-2009, as I have data on firms from 1992-2012. In this way I can look at pre- and
post-event periods of at least three years. 5. I also check that exits were permanent, and the plant was not
reopened in the next three years, either by the same owner or a new one. At the same time, I allow for new
8For sales and value added I use the producer price index (PPI) of the 2-digit industry. For export sales I use the export
price index of the 2-digit industry. For capital I use a capital deflator created as the average PPI of industries producing capital
goods: NACE Rev 1.1 sectors 29, 30, 31, 34 and 35. For materials I use a material price index calculated separately for each
2-digit industry: the weighted average PPI of all input-providing sectors with input shares as weights. For the wage I use a
wage index, calculated from the national average of per capita earnings.
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Figure 1: The location of treated and control settlements
entries in other industries. I will refer to the locations with a plant closure as ”treated”. It is important to
emphasize, that the information I collect on closures is at the plant-level, but the data sets which I use for
the matching and in the main analysis are at the firm-level.
I verify the information collected from the press using firm-level administrative data, containing ownership
and balance sheet information. I check ownership, compare decreases in the number of employment to the
announced number of people being laid off from the plant and also check exit from the database in case of
single-plant firms. The full list of plant closures, including the name of the firm, the city of the plant, plant
size, industry, city population and the time of closure can be found in Table A1 and A2 of the Appendix.
Most of the closures happened around the EU accession or in the crisis year 2009, but there are closures
from all years of the period 1998-2009. The majority of the observed plant closures happened in the food
industry, the wearing apparel industry and the footwear manufacturing industry. There are closures in other
industries as well, like manufacturing of electrical machinery, manufacturing of communication equipment
or manufacturing of paper. The number of employees laid off are typically below 250, but there are closing
plants with more than 1000 employees as well. The closing plants are important employers in the local
economy. Their average share in total employment within 10 km of the city is about 10%. Figure 1 shows
the treated settlements marked by red dots. The figure shows that treated settlements are located all over
Hungary with no significant spatial concentration.
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IV.B Assignment of controls
I assign control locations to treated locations using propensity score matching. I do cross-location com-
parisons to account for countrywide or global trends which could drive the results. Matching based on
pre-closure location characteristics helps me to choose comparable locations as controls. Additionally, if
exits were not entirely independent of location-specific characteristics, propensity score matching also helps
choosing controls being similarly at risk of a closure.
Candidates for controls are such cities in Hungary where an established foreign-owned large firm operated
in the year of a plant closure. Accordingly, I do propensity score matching on this subsample of city-year
observations, also including the previously collected events of closure. As there are two cases in which two
plant closures happened in the same city and in the same year, I have 47 treated city-year observations. I
will refer to a treated city-year observation as a case. I define a firm as established if it already existed three
years before the given year. In this way I exclude those cases where the outcomes in the control location
would be driven by a large new entry. I define a firm as foreign-owned if it had a majority foreign ownership
in the previous year or ever before, and disregard changes back to domestic ownership. Doing this I assume
that the experience of foreign ownership has long-lasting effects. Additionally, the local economy can benefit
from the presence of these firms still after the ownership change.9 I define a firm as large if the median
number of employees is at least 100 and there is a year when there are at least 150 employees. I assign these
firms to cities based on the headquarters of the firm, as I have a database with information on all firms only
at the firm-level. I identify closures on the plant-level using extra information from press announcements,
but I can only identify controls using firm-level information. This is a limitation, as with multi-plant firms I
lose potential control cities. Still, it doesn’t worsen the comparability of controls, provided that headquarters
are not separated from production facilities. This is a reasonable assumption except for Budapest, which I
exclude from the pool of potential controls. I also exclude treated cities from the set of potential controls
in the three-year period before the plant closure, but they are included earlier. In the estimation I use only
those city-year observations which had at least one firm operating in the industry of a treated plant closing
that year, and at some point there was a closure in the same NUTS2 region. In this way I end up with 168
potential control cities.
For the propensity score matching I estimate the following equation, using a probit model:
yct = Φ(β0+β1lPopct−1+β2lPopAct−1+β3Unempct−1+β4UnempAct−1+β5dUnempct−1+β6dUnempAct−1
+ β7Suppct−1 + β8Buyct−1 + β9Salesct−1 + β10dSalesct−1 + β11Ict + β12Dt + β13Rc + ct), (2)
where c denotes city and t denotes year. y is an indicator of plant closure, being one for the 49 plant closure
events and zero otherwise. lPop is working-age population in he city, which I measure as the number of
people being 18-59 years old, and lPopA is working-age population in the 30 km agglomeration, both mea-
sured in logs. Unemp and UnempA are the unemployment rate in the city and in the 30 km agglomeration
9Only 17% of the firms classified as foreign ever switch back to majority domestic ownership. This share is only 6% when I
aggregate up the measure to city-industry-year level.
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respectively. I measure the unemployment rate as the number of unemployed divided by the size of working-
age population. dUnemp refers to changes in the unemployment rate from two years before, measured in
percentage points. Supp is the share of the large foreign firm’s supplier industry in total employment within
the 30 km agglomeration of the city. Similarly, Buy is the share of the large foreign firm’s buyer industry
in total employment within the 30 km agglomeration of the city.10 Sales is total sales measured in logs and
dSales is the average growth rate of per firm sales, both measured in the 30 km agglomeration of the city.11
I is a set of industry dummies, being one if there was a foreign-owned large plant in the given city and
year operating in the given industry.12 Dt is a set of year dummies, and R is a set of NUTS-2-level region
dummies.
I use the estimated propensity scores for choosing the final set of controls. First, I ensure overlap between
treated and controls by dropping treated with a propensity score more than 20% higher than the highest
propensity score among the controls. I also drop those controls where the lowest treated propensity score is
more than 20% higher than the estimated propensity score of the control. As I cannot find any comparable
controls for 6 treated, I end up with 41 cases. I also drop those potential controls which were treated in
the previous two years. Then I create industry-year brackets and look for comparable controls within each
bracket. I look for control cities with a plant operating in the same industry as the closing plant, because I
am especially interested in the performance of firms in the buyer, the supplier and the same industry. In this
final step of matching I also drop those potential control cities which are closer than 30 km to the treated.
With this I ensure that there are no sizeable spillover effects from the treated to the control locations. In
the baseline version I assign a single control city to each treated case. From the remaining potential controls
within the given industry-year bracket I take the city which has a propensity score closest to the propensity
score of the treated. The same control city can be assigned to multiple cases, and a treated city can be a
control more than three years after or more than two years before the plant closure. The black triangles in
Figure 1 show the location of control cities. Like treated cities, controls are also located all over the country.
The full list of control cities with their size, and the name and size of the foreign-owned large firm can be
found in Table A1 and A2 of the Appendix. As a robustness check I use multiple controls, and assign all
the remaining potential controls within the given industry-year bracket to the treated. I weight each control
in such a way, that weights are proportional to the inverse of their distance from the treated in terms of
propensity scores and weights add up to one.
Checking pre-closure differences shows that treated and control cities are indeed comparable. Table 1
presents the results of this comparison when a single control city is assigned to each case. Table A5 of the
10I define the buyer industry differently for the matching than for the estimation of the plant closure effect by industry group.
Here I classify industry k as a buyer industry of industry i if k is different from i, and k uses at least 5% of all the output
produced by i and used by an industry. In about 1/3 of the observations there are foreign-owned large plants operating in
multiple industries. In these cases there is no single supplier or buyer share to be used. Since I am interested in the probability
of having a closing plant, I use the lowest buyer share, as I estimate a negative relationship between the buyer share and the
plant closure probability. As the estimated relationship between supplier share and plant closure is positive, I include the
highest supplier share in the regression for matching.
11When I calculate Sales and dSales I include only those firms which have a median level of employment of at least 5. I also
exclude the firms of the closing plants and all the large foreign firms operating in the potential control cities. I also get rid of
outliers in sales growth, excluding the lowest and highest 5% when calculating agglomeration-level averages.
12I use TEAOR’03 subsectors which almost correspond to 2-digit NACE Rev 1.1 codes, but groups together 15 and 16, 17
and 18, 21 and 22, 27 and 28, 30-33, 34 and 35, 36 and 37.
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Appendix does the same comparison for the version with multiple controls. Here I use weighted regressions
with a constant and a treated dummy on the right-hand side. Weights are the ones determined in the match-
ing procedure. When the treated dummy is insignificant, the two groups are similar in terms of the given
characteristic. Table 1 shows that the pre-closure characteristics used for the matching are not significantly
different in the treated and control groups. The only exceptions are city size and propensity score. Cities
with a closing plant are on average larger than the control cities.
Table 1: Similarity of treated and control cities before the closures
Pre-closure characteristics
Average for 
treated
Average for 
controls
P-value of H0: 
treated=control
0.31 0.13
(0.04) (0.02)
9.44 8.99
(0.22) (0.15)
11.80 11.85
(0.06) (0.05)
0.065 0.067
(0.006) (0.004)
0.068 0.067
(0.005) (0.004)
0.0026 0.0010
(0.0018) (0.0023)
0.0013 0.0015
(0.0017) (0.0016)
0.090 0.089
(0.010) (0.008)
0.122 0.127
(0.013) (0.010)
19.27 19.38
(0.012) (0.010)
0.130 0.128
(0.007) (0.007)
2-year change in city 
.unemployment rate (pp)
0.45
Log working-age 
.population in 30 km
0.50
Controls: a single control is matched to each case
Unemployment rate                
.in city 
0.82
Propensity score 0.00
Log working-age 
.population in city
0.04
Unemployment rate               
.in 30 km
0.77
Controls are cities with a foreign-owned large firm operating in the same industry as the closing plant, and 
having the closest propensity score to the treated. Pre-closure characteristics are measured one year before 
the plant closure. 2-year change in the unemployment rate refers to changes from t-3 to t-1 where t is the 
year of the plant closure, and it is expressed in percentage points. Working-age population refers to the 
number of people aged 18-59 on Dec. 31. of the given year.  Unemployment rate is the number of registered 
unemployed on Dec. 20. of the given year, divided by the working-age population. Buyer-industry share is the 
employment share of firms operating in the buyer industries of the closing plant in total employment. 
Supplier-industry share is defined analogously. Buyers are industries which use more than 5% of the closing 
plant industry's output, suppliers are industries of which more than 5% of the closing plant industry's inputs 
come. Total sales and average sales growth is calculated omitting the closing plant's firm and the foreign-
owned large firms in the control cities. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Log total sales in 30 km 0.46
Average sales growth            
.in 30 km
0.75
2-year change in 30 km 
.unemployment rate (pp)
0.93
Buyer-industry share              
.in 30 km
0.99
Supplier-industry share          
.in 30 km
0.67
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V Empirical strategy
V.A Estimation
I use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, combined with an event study approach. In my
estimation strategy I build on Greenstone et al. (2010) and partly also on Greenstone and Moretti (2004).
In these papers the authors look at the effect of large plant openings on the local economy by using the
runner-up locations as controls. Analogously, I use comparable locations with similar but still operating
plants as controls. I assume that FDI exits are independent of the local economic conditions. Consequently,
control locations being similar before the closure provide a proper counterfactual, showing what would have
happened in the treated locations without the plant closure.
I measure the effect of plant closures by comparing outcomes of firms located in the treated and in the
control area, before and after the closure. I use a somewhat more flexible version of a simple difference-in-
differences estimation, as I divide the before and after periods to multiple sub-periods. This approach helps
me to separate immediate effects (1-3 years after the closure) from effects in the longer-run (4-5 years after
the closure). As there are few cases from the early years with a long post-closure period, my sample size
drops considerably six years after the closure, and I cannot reliably estimate long-run effects beyond 5 years.
To control for this drop I include separate dummies for early and late periods with few observations. I define
an early period as 7 or more years before the plant closure, and a late period as 6 or more years after the
plant closure. Figure A1 of the Appendix shows the number of cases by event-year, where event-years are
normalized to zero in the year of the plant closure. All the cases have observations up to 3 years after the
plant closure. This supports my choice to cut the first period of interest 3 years after the closure. In the
baseline specification I estimate the following equation, where the unit of observation is firm-year-case:
Yit = β0+β1Treatedic+β2Before7ct+β3After1 3ct+β4After4 5ct+β5After6ct+β6TreatedicBefore7ct
+ β7TreatedicAfter1 3ct + β8TreatedicAfter4 5ct + β9TreatedicAfter6ct + αi + αct + αt + uict, (3)
where i stands for firm, c denotes case and t denotes year. Y stands for the various outcome variables:
log sales, log employment, labor productivity in logs, log per capita wage or log total factor productivity.
Treated is a dummy being one if the firm is located in a treated area. I assign firms to treated and control
locations based on the location of their headquarters two years before the plant closure. For firms with a later
entry I use the first location, for firms with an earlier exit I use the last location. A treated location consists
of the city with the closing plant and the agglomeration around the city. I define control locations in the
same way. As the baseline I define the agglomeration as a 10 km radius circle around the city. I determine
the settlements which belong to each agglomeration by using distance data of settlement pairs.13 Before7,
After1 3, After4 5 and After6 are case-specific dummies being one in 7 or more years before, 1-3 years after,
4-5 years after or 6 and more years after the plant closure, respectively. TreatedBefore7, TreatedAfter1 3,
13Table A10 of the Appendix shows the average number of treated and control firms per case. As treated cities are on average
larger than controls, there are also more firms in the treated locations than in the controls.
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TreatedAfter4 5 and TreatedAfter6 denote the interaction terms of time period dummies and the treated
dummy. The variables of interest are TreatedAfter1 3 and TreatedAfter4 5, which show if the outcomes
of treated firms 1-3 years and 4-5 years after the plant closure are different on average from the outcomes
of control firms, controlling for pre-treatment differences in the 6-year period before the closure. Finally, I
also include fixed effects for firm (αi), case (αct) and calendar-year (αt), and uict is the error term. I cluster
the standard errors by city14, allowing for correlated errors within cities. I estimate bootstrapped standard
errors in the regression where the left-hand side variable is log TFP, which is an estimated measure. I include
only those firms in the analysis which have at least 5 employees, taking the median value. In this way I
expect to have more robust estimates, as very small firms tend to misreport more frequently. I also exclude
all the firms with a closing plant and the foreign-owned large firms operating in the same industry in the
control locations. Finally, I exclude those outliers which ever had a sales value larger than 0.5% of the total
sales of all firms in the database that year. There are only 33 such firms.
When I look at the effect on exit probability I estimate a modified version of equation 3. I estimate a
simple linear probability model with a dummy on the left-hand side being one if the given year is the last
year of the firm before exit. Following Bernard and Jensen (2007), instead of firm-fixed effects I control
for firm characteristics like age, log of employment, capital to labor ratio, per capita wage, TFP and an
indicator showing that the firm has never exported before. I include fixed effects for case, industry15 and
calendar year, and I cluster the standard errors by firm.
As a robustness check I also use two alternative specifications. In line with Greenstone et al. (2010), the
first specification controls for potential differences in trends before the closure. This ensures that average
differences after the plant closure are not driven by different trends in treated and control locations, which
can already be observed in the pre-closure period. I estimate the following equation:
Yit = β0 + β1Treatedic + β2Trendt + β3TreatedicTrendt + β4Afterct + β5TrendtAfterct
+ β6TreatedicAfterct + β7TreatedicTrendtAfterct + αi + αct + αt + uict.
(4)
I include a simple time trend (Trend), allowing for different trends in treated and control groups (TreatedTrend),
and a trend break after the plant closure (TrendAfter), which can also be different in treated locations
(TreatedTrendAfter). In this specification I use observations only from the period 6 years before and 5
years after the closure, omitting the Before7 and After6 dummies. I also include a single dummy for the
period after the plant closure (After). The variables of interest are the interactions of Treated with the
after period and with the trend difference after the closure. β6 shows if there is a level shift and β7 shows if
there is a change in the trend after the closure.
The second alternative specification is even more flexible. Instead of the time period dummies I use a full
set of event-year dummies, also interacted with the Treated dummy. Event-years are calculated relative to
the year of the plant closure. For positive event-years, coefficients on the interaction terms measure if firms
in treated and control locations have significantly different outcomes a given year after the plant closure.
14For the clustering of standard errors I use the first location of each firm in order to give a nested structure.
15I use a time-invariant 2-digit NACE Rev. 1.1 categorisation. I assign a firm to that industry in which it operated for the
longest time throughout its life.
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In the analysis I also check if there is any heterogeneity in the plant closure effect by the characteristics
of local firms or by the characteristics of the closing plant or the location. For doing this I include additional
firm group or case group dummies into equation 3, also in interactions with all the other right-hand-side
variables (treated dummy, time period dummies and their interactions) of equation 3. The coefficients of
interest are the ones on the triple interaction term of the treated and after period dummies with the firm
group or case group dummies. Interactions with firm group dummies show if the plant closure had a signifi-
cantly different effect on the given firm group compared to firms in the baseline category. Interactions with
case group dummies show the same for firms located close to specific types of closures.
V.B Identification issues
The two main concerns with the identification are the possible endogeneity of exits and potential other
reasons for which controls might not provide a proper counterfactual for the treated locations. Concerning
the first, if exits happened systematically in locations with worsening economic conditions, the observed
worse performance of local firms after the plant closure would be the result of local tendencies and not the
result of the closure. There are three arguments against that. First, the literature shows that foreign firms are
more footloose than domestic firms.16 Foreign-owned firms are more likely to close or relocate due to global
strategic considerations which are unrelated to local economic conditions. Second, press announcements and
articles on the plant closures in my sample never mention location-specific economic problems among the
reasons for the closure.17 Some of the reasons are country-specific, like high wages compared to Asia or
regulation changes after the EU-accession. Using control locations, however, I account for these country-
wide factors changing over time. As control cities have large foreign plants operating in the same industry
as the closing plant, I also account for potential global industry-specific shocks. Third, I assign control
locations in such a way that I ensure pre-closure comparability. Outcomes in the treated and control groups
are not significantly different in the period before the closure. Additionally, as a robustness check I test if
differences in pre-closure trends can account for differences in post-closure outcomes. Results are robust to
the inclusion of treatment group-specific trends. It might also be the case, that the foreign-owned large plants
close because they are worse than the comparable plants in the control locations. As a result, the presence
of the foreign firm could have different impact on the local economy in treated and control locations. Local
firms, however, have similar performance in treated and control locations before the closure. Additionally,
my main results are robust to the exclusion of those cases where the plants closed because of indebtedness.
The second concern is the comparability of controls. The relatively worse performance of the treated
firms after the closure might be the result of the exceptionally good performance of control firms. It might
be the case if control firms are not hurt by the plant closure but benefit from that. For example, people
being laid off from the plant provide cheap labor or supplier firms losing their business partners are ready to
16e.g. Alvarez and Go¨rg (2009), Bernard and Sjo¨holm (2003), Bernard and Jensen (2007), Kneller et al. (2012), van Beveren
(2007).
17The full list of closures with the publicly available information on why plants closed can be found in Table A3 and A4 of
the Appendix.
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provide cheaper inputs. As controls are located far18 and most of the plants are not large enough19 to have
considerable effect on far-away locations, it is unlikely that the difference is due to favourable consequences
of plant closures for the control locations. Alternatively, control locations might have other positive shocks
at the time of the plant closures improving their economy and leading to a downward bias in a measured
negative plant closure effect. As I have several closures from different years, it is unlikely that control cities
systematically get positive shocks in the year of the corresponding closure. Additionally, I show that results
remain robust to narrowing down the set of cases to different subgroups.
In the estimations I don’t control for additional closures (e.g. smaller firms or domestic ones), mass layoffs
or entries. I assume that without the plant closures exits and entries occur randomly. After a plant closure
I treat changes in the number of exits or entries as outcomes. On one hand, the negative effect of a large
plant closure on the local economy might result in further exits. On the other hand, if the plant closure
was exogenous, the location could become attractive for new entrants. The local economic policy is also
likely to work hard for attracting new investors. I consider these as potential results of a closure. In case
of new entries the effect I estimate is definitely lower than the direct effect of a plant closure without a new
entry. Yet, I am interested in the net effect which includes the potential counterbalance of new entries. If
the foreign-owned large plants close because of negative industry-level shocks, the comparable foreign firms
operating in the same industry in the control locations might be also affected. If this resulted in mass layoffs
in control locations which I don’t control for, it would go against me, biasing the estimated effects towards
zero.
V.C Different channels of the plant-closure effect
After the baseline estimations I give some evidence on the different channels of the plant closure effect. I use
a simplified and somewhat modified version of the model presented in Acemoglu et al. (2010) to show which
are the expected effects of a plant closure on the local economy. Here I only summarize the results, I present
the model in Appendix A. If the closing plant had only few local buyers and sold most of its output in other
locations, its closure is such a local shock which I expect to propagate upwards. This means, firms in the
supplier industries of the closing plant’s industry face lower demand. This leads to decreases both in their
output and in the amount of inputs they use. I call this the ”input/output linkages channel”. The average
export share of the closing plants was 62%, and the large manufacturing plants also sold in different locations
within Hungary. So it is reasonable to assume that there were very few local buyers, and as a result, firms
operating in the buyer industry were not affected more than the average firm. If the ”input/output linkages
channel” is at work, I expect that firms operating in the supplier industry are hurt more than average, but
firms operating in the buyer industry might not be affected differently than the average firm.
Decreasing local labor demand puts a downward pressure on wages. The average wage might indeed
decrease if the laid-off are ready to work for a lower wage. From the firms’ perspective this is equivalent to
18According to Google Maps, the average road distance between treated and control cities is 204 km. There are only six
cases, where the distance is less than 60 km. The closest city pair is 40 km away from each other.
19The average size of a closing plant is 340 employees. 10 plants had more than 500 employees and only 3 firms had more
than 1000 employees.
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a lower input price, and as a result firms use labor more intensively. I call this the ”increasing labor supply”
channel. Although it is not a model prediction, I expect that those firms can benefit the most from the
increased labor supply which employ people with similar skills and experiences as the closing plant. This is
definitely true for firms operating in the same industry as the closing plant. If the ”increasing labor supply”
channel is at work, I expect that firms operating in the same industry as the closing plant are hurt less than
average or can even benefit from the closure.
Finally, decreasing local labor demand lowers the income of local households, both by decreasing wages and
increasing unemployment if there is no perfect adjustment of wages. Lower income lowers the consumption
of local households, decreasing local demand for consumer goods. I call this the ”decreasing purchasing
power” channel. Especially those firms are affected which sell a lot locally. If the ”decreasing purchasing
power” channel is at work, I expect firms providing non-tradable local services to be hurt more than average
by the plant closure.
I test the above assumptions by allowing for differences in the plant closure effect by industry groups. I
estimate a modified version of equation 3, where I interact all the right-hand side variables with four industry
group dummies, standing for supplier industry, buyer industry, the closing plant’s industry and local services.
I do all the industry categorizations by 2-digit NACE categories. I define the supplier and buyer industries
as I described in the Data section. I define local services as the sum of 52. Retail trade and 55. Hotels and
restaurants. I present the average number of firms per case operating in the different industry categories in
Table A10 of the Appendix.
VI Results
VI.A Suggestive evidence on aggregates
As a starting point I show the evolution of aggregate sales and employment in the average closure event,
looking at the 10 km agglomeration. Figure 2 shows coefficient estimates from case-level regressions of log
total sales and employment on event-year dummies and their interaction with the treatment indicator, also
controlling for city-fixed effects. I present the estimated average for each event year separately in the treated
and control group, taking two years before the closure as the reference point. In the first row of Figure 2 I
also include sales and employment of the closing plant. The figures suggest that total sales and employment
decrease after the closure without recovering even after five years. The figures also suggest that treated and
controls are comparable in terms of aggregates 1-3 years before the closures but not earlier. Figures in the
second row show the same estimates when I exclude the closing and the control plants from the estimation.
The difference after the closure disappears, suggesting that local firms seem to be unaffected on average.
This might be the result of no effect, or of a heterogeneous effect, where the positive effect on some firms
and the negative effect on others average out. Figures A2 and A3 of the Appendix suggest that the effect is
indeed heterogeneous, larger firms seem to gain and smaller firms lose, competitors gain and suppliers lose
to some extent. As an additional source of heterogeneity, the third row of Figure 2 shows that local firms in
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smaller cities also tend to lose.
I can further support the heterogeneity across cases by doing a simple back of the envelope calculation,
where I compare the growth rate of total sales and total employment in treated and control firms, case by
case. I look at the period 2 years before and 3 years after the closure. In this exercise I exclude the closing
and control plants. Taking the average difference in the growth rates weighted by the levels 2 years before
the closure, I find that the average growth rate in treated cities is 17 percentage points higher for sales and
3 percentage points higher for employment. There is a large heterogeneity, though, growth of total sales is
lower in the treated city for 25 out of the 41 cases, and growth of employment is lower for 23 cases. When I
only look at small cities, I find that the weighted average growth rate in treated cities is 7 percentage points
lower for sales and 1.9 percentage points lower for employment compared to controls. Looking at simple
averages, differences between treated and control cities suggest, that total sales growth would have been 15%
higher in the treated cities without the plant closure. As a comparison, the observed average growth rate
in the treated cities is 27%. When I decompose the growth rate difference between treated and controls to
the contribution of continuing, newly entering and exiting firms, as suggested in Eaton et al. (2007), I find
that the share of continuing firms is quite large in most cases. The contribution of the continuing firms in
the median case is 81% for sales and 68% for employment. These results support my approach to focus on
the incumbents.
In the followings, I look at firm-level estimates where I can control for potential composition differences
between the treated and the control group. First, I present the estimated average effect of a foreign-owned
large plant closure on the local firms. Then I show some evidence on the different channels of the plant
closure effect. Next, I show heterogeneity in these estimates by ownership, firm size and productivity. After
that, I show how the estimated effect differs by various characteristics of the closing plant and the location.
Finally, I evaluate the aggregate employment effect, and show some robustness checks for the main results.
VI.B Effect on local firms
In the estimations I focus on the short-run effect of foreign-owned large plant closures on local firms,
looking at changes in different firm-level outcomes 1-3 years after the closure. My secondary interest is on
the period 4-5 years after the closure. Table 2 shows the baseline results for all firms in treated or control
cities, having at least 5 employees at the median. On average, sales decreased by 6 percentage points and
employment decreased by 3 percentage points 1-3 years after the plant closure. Effects seem to be persistent,
as 4-5 years after the plant closure the sales and employment difference between treated and closure location
firms is even larger. At the same time, I find no significant effect on productivity, average wage or exit
probability. The treated dummy is small and insignificant in all cases, which supports my identification
strategy. It shows, that firms in treated and control locations are on average not significantly different from
each other in the baseline period before the closure.
Next, I show how the difference in sales and employment between treated and control firms evolves over
time. I use a flexible specification with event-year dummies instead of time period dummies in the period
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Figure 2: Case-level averages of the log of total employment and sales within 10 km agglomeration, including
or excluding the closing plant
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Table 2: Baseline regression results for firm-level outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
0.008 0.000 0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
-0.061*** -0.030** -0.010 -0.007 -0.005 0.003
(0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002)
-0.077** -0.049** -0.013 -0.010 0.001 0.002
(0.030) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.003)
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Treated x Far-away period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 359,826 353,768 326,784 330,158 353,607 332,702
Number of unique firms 26,434 26,512 25,914 26,142 26,527
Treated
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and 
foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four 
separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the 
plant closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes 
the period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Fixed effects 
for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log 
capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In 
columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** 
p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
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[t-6,t+5], where t denotes the year of the closure. For early and late years outside this period I use the
period dummies, as before. Figure 3 shows the yearly difference in sales and employment by plotting the
estimated coefficients on the interaction terms of the event-year dummies with the treated dummy. The
figures also include the 95% confidence intervals. The yearly patterns show that firms in treated locations
start to sell less and employ relatively fewer people somewhat before the closure, and the gap between treated
and control firms increases over time. The difference in sales and employment becomes significant only one
and two years after the closure. Figure A4 in the Appendix show similar estimates for sales and employment
separately, plotting the coefficients on event-year dummies and the sum of coefficients on event-year dummies
and their interaction term with the treated dummy. The figures show that there are two reasons for the
increase between treated and control firms after the plant closure. On one hand, treated firms have lower
sales and employment compared to pre-closure levels. Second, control firms start to increase in the period
after the closure. This pattern shows, that even simple within-treated comparisons show evidence for a
negative effect of the plant closures on local firms. Assuming that the controls form a proper counterfactual,
these figures also show that a simple within-treated comparison would underestimate the closure effect, as
it doesn’t account for the foregone potential increases in the post-closure period.
Using the estimates from the flexible specification I calculate the average annual growth rate lost due to
the plant closure. I use the formula 12 (e
δ3 − eδ1)− 17 (eδ1 − eδ−6), where δt is the coefficient on the interaction
term of the treated dummy with the indicator of event-year t. I calculate that the annual growth rate of sales
was 0.5 percentage point lower and the annual growth rate of employment was 0.9 percentage point lower
in local firms after the plant closure. As a comparison for the magnitude of the effect, average yearly sales
growth in the estimation sample 1-3 years after the closures is 1.5%, and the average yearly employment
growth is 1%. As an additional comparison, Carvalho et al. (2014) find that the suppliers of those firms
which exit due to the tsunami suffer a 6 percentage point decrease in sales growth after the exit. Barrot and
Sauvagnat (2015) find 3.1 percentage points decrease in sales growth for customers of a firm which was hit
by a natural disaster. The effect I estimate is lower, but its magnitude is still significant comparing to the
average growth rate.
Figure 4 shows how the average unemployment rate evolved over time around the plant closure in treated
and control cities. I estimate a flexible, case-level version of equation 3, with unemployment rate in the city
as a dependent variable. As right-hand side variables I have event year dummies and their interactions
with a dummy for treated cities, and I also include city fixed effects. I do the estimations for the period
including five years before and after the plant closure. In order to show unemployment trends in the control
cities I plot the estimated coefficients of the event-year dummies. The sum of the coefficients on event-year
dummies and their interactions with the treated dummy shows unemployment patterns in the treated cities.
The reference period is two years before the plant closure, as in some cases layoffs start even one year before
the closure. Unemployment rate increases over time in both groups, but it clearly jumps up in the closure
year in treated locations and stays at a relatively higher level even five years after the closure. Figure A5
of the Appendix shows that no similar pattern can be observed in the number of people moving out of the
city. People don’t move away after the closures.
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Figure 3: Baseline regression results with a flexible specification: triple interaction term coefficient estimates
with 95% confidence interval
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Figure 4: The average unemployment rate in treated and control cities around the plant closure, normalized
to zero two years before the closure
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VI.C Industry groups
In this section I look for evidence which supports the existence of the different channels through which
a plant closure affects the local firms. Table 3 presents estimates of the heterogeneous effect by industry
group. Employment of firms operating in local services or in the supplier industry of the closing plant
decrease more than average. On the other hand, firms operating in the same industry as the closing plant
significantly increase their employment compared to similar firms in the control locations. The effect on
sales is not significantly different by industry group, but patterns are similar to the observed heterogeneity
in the employment effect. Additionally, competitors exit in treated locations with a lower probability.
The estimates provide supporting evidence for three potential channels of the plant closure effect. First,
estimated patterns suggest, that firms providing non-tradable local services are hurt more than average by
the plant closure. This is in line with the assumption, that people getting unemployed or having jobs with
lower wages consume less due to having lower income. Then demand from local consumption decreases,
especially hurting those firms which sell mostly locally, like firms providing non-tradable local services. The
estimated patterns support the existence of the ”decrease in local purchasing power” channel. Second, firms
operating in the same industry as the closing plant seem to benefit from the closure. The reason might be
lower competition for local inputs, like labor. This is in line with the existence of the ”increased local labor
supply” channel. I expect that especially those firms can benefit, which employ people with similar skills
and experiences as the closing plant, like firms operating in the same industry. Third, although results are
weak, firms operating in the supplier industry of the closing plant seem to be hurt more than average. This
supports the existence of the ”input/output linkages” channel, hurting local firms which lose their business
partners. I find no differential effects for buyer-industry firms. As the closing plants exported a lot, I expect
that there were only very few local buyers. This explains why buyers are not hurt by lost local supplies.
VI.D Heterogeneity by the characteristics of the local firms
After looking at differential effects by industry, I allow for a heterogeneous effect by other characteristics of
the local firms. Table 4 shows estimation results by ownership. I classify a local firm as foreign-owned if it
had a majority foreign ownership 2 years before the plant closure. Though coefficients are only marginally
significant, foreign-owned firms seem to lose less than domestic firms or even gain in terms of sales and em-
ployment. Foreign-owned firms also have higher productivity and lower exit probability after the treatment.
Longer-run effects are not significant but have the same sign. These results are reasonable if foreign-owned
firms are able to take advantage of increased local labor supply. After the large plant closure the local
authorities might also put more effort in keeping these firms from relocating by providing more support or
other local benefits.
In Table 5 I look at the plant closure effect by productivity group. I define productivity tertiles using
estimated TFP values 2 years before the closure. I determine the cutoffs for the tertiles separately for each
2-digit industry. Coefficient estimates are rarely significant, but the patterns suggest, that low-productivity
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Table 3: Heterogeneity of the effect by the industry of the local firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
-0.054** -0.019 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 0.000
(0.027) (0.015) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003)
-0.038 -0.044** -0.016 -0.001 -0.002 0.002
(0.027) (0.021) (0.022) (0.011) (0.015) (0.006)
0.162 0.180** -0.076 -0.018 -0.015 -0.033**
(0.119) (0.086) (0.065) (0.035) (0.040) (0.015)
-0.045 -0.068* 0.012 0.003 -0.015 -0.002
(0.045) (0.041) (0.028) (0.018) (0.012) (0.006)
0.052 0.041 -0.015 0.007 0.025 0.010
(0.066) (0.041) (0.034) (0.016) (0.019) (0.008)
-0.070** -0.037 -0.011 -0.014 0.002 0.001
(0.035) (0.027) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.004)
-0.037 -0.037 -0.029 0.031 -0.017 -0.008
(0.048) (0.031) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021) (0.008)
0.108 0.155 -0.008 0.017 -0.018 0.004
(0.135) (0.107) (0.059) (0.055) (0.049) (0.023)
-0.044 -0.100* 0.012 0.005 -0.020 0.005
(0.062) (0.058) (0.033) (0.032) (0.024) (0.009)
0.029 0.067 0.040 -0.042 0.035 -0.011
(0.107) (0.079) (0.045) (0.029) (0.032) (0.011)
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Treated x Far-away period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry group dummies in interactions YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 359,826 353,768 326,784 330,158 353,607 332,702
Number of unique firms 26,434 26,512 25,914 26,142 26,527
Treated x After(4-5) x LocalServices
Treated x After(4-5) x Competitor
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and 
foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. LocalServices indicate to firms providing local services. Buyer and Supplier indicate firms operating in the buyer 
or supplier industries of the closing plant. Competitor indicates firms operating in the same industry as the closing plant. The other right-hand side variables are 
also interacted with the industry group dummies. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four 
separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant 
closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the 
period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Fixed effects for firm 
(or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log capital/labor 
ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) 
standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 
* p<0.1.
Treated x After(4-5) x Supplier
Treated x After(4-5) x Buyer
Treated x After(4-5)
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(1-3) x LocalServices
Treated x After(1-3) x Competitor
Treated x After(1-3) x Supplier
Treated x After(1-3) x Buyer
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Table 4: Heterogeneity of the effect by the ownership of the local firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
-0.079*** -0.038*** -0.019* -0.005 -0.011 0.001
(0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002)
-0.113*** -0.063*** -0.023 -0.010 -0.013 -0.001
(0.030) (0.019) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.003)
0.144* 0.112* 0.093* 0.002 0.062* -0.016*
(0.079) (0.059) (0.050) (0.023) (0.035) (0.010)
0.158 0.135 0.051 0.054 0.117 0.015
(0.128) (0.088) (0.088) (0.055) (0.076) (0.012)
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Treated x Far-away period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Foreign dummy in interactions YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 272,760 268,326 250,249 252,388 271,633 257,250
Number of unique firms 14,690 14,700 14,542 14,688 15,326
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
Treated x After(4-5) x Foreign
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and 
foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four 
separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant 
closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the 
period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Foreign is an 
indicator of those firms which were foreign-owned 2 years before the closure. Interactions of the foreign dummy with all the other right-hand side variables are 
also included. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log 
employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are 
clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(1-3) x Foreign
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Table 5: Heterogeneity of the effect by the productivity of the local firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
-0.107** -0.041 -0.020 0.008 -0.017 -0.002
(0.043) (0.030) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.004)
-0.026 -0.014 0.017 -0.011 0.012* -0.000
(0.025) (0.019) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
-0.037 -0.004 -0.018 0.006 0.001 -0.005
(0.032) (0.023) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.004)
-0.107 -0.057 0.010 0.031 0.002 -0.009
(0.066) (0.047) (0.030) (0.021) (0.023) (0.006)
-0.030 0.003 -0.003 -0.000 0.018* -0.000
(0.035) (0.029) (0.024) (0.019) (0.010) (0.006)
-0.052 -0.037 -0.022 -0.017 -0.006 0.004
(0.053) (0.041) (0.027) (0.017) (0.015) (0.006)
TFP group dummies in interactions YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 359,826 353,768 326,784 330,158 353,607 332,702
Number of unique firms 26,434 26,512 25,914 26,142 26,527
Treated x After(1-3) x LowTFP
Treated x After(1-3) x MediumTFP
Treated x After(4-5) x MediumTFP
Treated x After(4-5) x HighTFP
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and 
foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. LowTFP is an indicator of those firms which were in the lowest productivity tertiles of their 2-digit industry 2 
years before the closure. MediumTFP and HighTFP stands for the middle and the highest productivity tertile. All the other right-hand side variables are included 
only in interactions with the productivity group dummies. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include 
four separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the 
plant closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the 
period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Fixed effects for 
firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log 
capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns 
(1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** 
p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(1-3) x HighTFP
Treated x After(4-5) x LowTFP
firms lost the most after the plant closure. This pattern is especially clear for sales. Table A12 of the Ap-
pendix shows similar results for size groups. There I use fixed size cutoffs, resulting in decreasing group size
for larger firms. Similarly to productivity, the estimated coefficients are rarely significant, but the patterns
suggest that smaller firms were hurt more by the plant closure.
VI.E Heterogeneity by the characteristics of the plant closure
Next, I test if the effect of a plant closure depends on some characteristics of the closing plant or on the type
of the treated location. I classify closing plants based on export intensity and size, and also group locations
based on city size and pre-closure unemployment level, creating two groups for each. I define high export
intensity if the export share of the closing plant’s firm is higher than 50% 2 years before the plant closure.
I define small plants as plants with at most 300 employees before the closure. The cutoff for city size is
24
Table 6: Heterogeneity of the effect by the characteristics of the location
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
-0.026 -0.016 0.008 -0.006 0.016* 0.001
(0.026) (0.018) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003)
-0.040 -0.007 -0.009 -0.019 0.018 0.002
(0.039) (0.027) (0.024) (0.016) (0.012) (0.004)
-0.060* -0.020 -0.034** -0.003 -0.038*** 0.004
(0.032) (0.022) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.004)
-0.079 -0.094*** -0.002 0.022 -0.033** 0.001
(0.049) (0.035) (0.027) (0.017) (0.015) (0.006)
Number of observations 359,826 353,768 326,784 330,158 353,607 332,702
Number of unique firms 26,434 26,512 25,914 26,142 26,527
-0.047* -0.001 -0.013 -0.008 -0.006 -0.000
(0.027) (0.019) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
-0.042 -0.006 -0.027 -0.015 0.003 0.002
(0.041) (0.035) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
-0.008 -0.055* 0.013 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.035) (0.028) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005)
-0.017 -0.085* 0.043 0.004 0.000 -0.004
(0.051) (0.045) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020) (0.007)
Number of observations 359,826 353,768 326,784 330,158 353,607 332,702
Number of unique firms 26,434 26,512 25,914 26,142 26,527
Treated x After(1-3) x SmallCity
Treated x After(4-5) x SmallCity
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and 
foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four 
separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant 
closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the 
period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. SmallCity is an 
indicator of those cases where the the city of the closing plant had less than 40,000 working-age inhabitants. HighUnemp is a dummy for cases having a higher 
than median level unemployment rate in the 30 km agglomeration 2 years before the closure. Interactions of the case group dummy with all the other right-hand 
side variables are also included. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. Column (6) includes firm-
year-level characteristics as log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-
year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in 
column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
Treated x After(1-3) x HighUnemp
Treated x After(4-5) x HighUnemp
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
at 40,000 working-age inhabitants in the year before the plant closure. I classify a location as having high
unemployment share if the unemployment share in the 30 km agglomeration 2 years before the closure is
above the median value of the 41 cases. The number of cases with the different characteristics can be found
in Table A13 of the Appendix. Categories are not strongly overlapping.
The upper panel of Table 6 shows that plant closures in locations with worse initial economic conditions
are hurt more by a plant closure. Sales, employment and productivity of local firms in a location with a
high unemployment level decrease considerably more than in locations with a low level of unemployment.
This is a reasonable finding, as local economies with a high unemployment level even before the closure are
less capable to cope with the problem of new layoffs. The lower panel of Table 6 suggests that the effect
on sales is uniform across cities with different size, but the employment effect is significantly larger in small
cities. Table A14 of the Appendix shows that there are no significant differences in the effect of closures
with high or low export share or by size of the closing plant. At the same time, the negative effect on labor
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productivity and average wage becomes significant for the cases with a less export-oriented closing plant.
There is no wage effect where the closing plant is more export-oriented. A potential explanation might be
that experience of the laid-off workers is valued more when the plant produced for export. This might have
counterbalanced the wage-decreasing effect of the increased local labor supply.
I use three additional measures capturing the local importance of the closing plant to see if more impor-
tant plants had a stronger effect when they closed. I group cases based on the relative size of the closing
plant compared to the total employment of all other firms within the 10 km agglomeration. I use the median
value (5%) and 15% as alternative cutoffs. Table A15 of the Appendix suggests that those plants which
are larger compared to the local economy tend to have a stronger negative effect on local firms, but the
difference is not significant. As alternative measures, I proxy the embeddedness of the plant in the local
economy with the age of the plant and the length of operation as a foreign-owned firm. I expect that both
are correlated with the strength of local links, but the second might be a better measure if the new foreign
owners do not keep the old business links. For each measure I create two case groups using 10 years as the
cutoff. Alternatively, I interact the number of years minus one with the treatment indicator, measuring the
additional effect of an extra year the closing plant existed or was foreign. Table 7 shows that the negative
effect on the sales of local firms is significantly larger for firms being present for a longer time, especially if
they were also foreign-owned for longer. Older plants seem to have no additional effect on the employment
of local firms, and the additional effect of plants being foreign owned for a longer time is not significant
either.
I also check if the estimated effects differ by the activity of the closing plant. I create four industry
groups. Food contains 11 closures in NACE category 15. Textile & leather contains 17 closures in NACE
categories 17, 18 and 19. Machinery & equipment contains 8 closures in NACE categories 29, 30, 31, 32 and
34. The remaining 5 closures are in NACE categories 21, 25, 26 and 27. I present the results by case groups
in Table A16 of the Appendix. The overall negative effect on sales and employment is not significantly
different in the four industry groups. Still, the effects seem to disappear for plant closures in machinery
and equipment industries. Most of these closures are in locations with a low unemployment rate before the
closure, and all these firms had high export shares. Consequently, the laid-offs having valuable experiences
at the foreign firm might have been able to find a new employment relatively easily in a location with better
economic conditions.
Finally, I find some heterogeneity in the effect by the owner of the closing plant. I create four groups of
owners: German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria and Switzerland), UK and the Netherlands, Mediter-
ranean countries (Italy, Greece and Cyprus) and others including USA, Taiwan and global firms without
a clear home country. Using the group of other owners as the baseline, Table A17 of the Appendix shows
that the effect is not significantly higher for German-speaking firms where the distance to Hungary is the
lowest. At the same time, the negative effect is somewhat stronger when the owners come from the UK or
the Netherlands. Table A18 of the Appendix shows that the closing plants in this group operated and were
foreign for a longer time, suggesting that they might have been more embedded in the local economy.
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Table 7: Differences in the plant closure effect by the embeddedness of the closing plant in the local economy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Length of operation:
VARIABLES
-0.029 0.014 -0.025 0.021 -0.028 -0.033 -0.016 -0.020
(0.028) (0.043) (0.023) (0.039) (0.024) (0.034) (0.019) (0.031)
-0.037 -0.012 -0.057* -0.015 -0.016 -0.005 -0.031 -0.024
(0.036) (0.060) (0.031) (0.049) (0.033) (0.055) (0.026) (0.046)
-0.051 -0.075** -0.004 -0.030
(0.034) (0.030) (0.029) (0.024)
-0.062 -0.045 -0.056 -0.050
(0.047) (0.050) (0.039) (0.036)
-0.007* -0.009** 0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Treated, time period and case group 
...dummies, also in interactions
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE, case FE, calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 359,826 359,826 359,826 359,826 353,768 353,768 353,768 353,768
Number of unique firms 26,434 26,434 26,434 26,434 26,512 26,512 26,512 26,512
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and foreing-
owned large firms in the control locations. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four separate time 
period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Far-away 
periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and 
After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. More than 10 years is an indicator for the 
closing plant having operated for more than 10 years (in columns (1) and (5)) or having been foreign for more than 10 years (in columns (3) and (7)). Length 
measures the number of years above one the closing plant has operated (in columns (2) and (6)) or has been foreign (in columns (4) and (8)). Length variables are 
also interacted with all other indicators. Fixed effects for firm, case and calendar year are also included. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by city. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
total as foreign total as foreign
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
log sales log employment
Treated x After(1-3) x Length
Treated x After(4-5) x Length
Treated x After(1-3) x More than 10 years
Treated x After(4-5) x More than 10 years
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VI.F Aggregate employment effect
In order to capture the aggregate employment effect of plant closures in the local economy, first I check the
plant closure effect on the extensive margin. On average, I find no significant effect on either the number or
the size composition of entering or exiting firms. Consequently, I only need to add up the within-firm effect
I estimated for employment growth. As E(log(y)) 6= log(E(y)), I account for heteroskedasticity using the
solution suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). I estimate a Poisson regression using the functional form
E(yi) = e
βXi with βXi specified as in equation 3. I add two modifications. First, for ease of computation
I don’t include firm-fixed effects, but I restrict the sample to firms being already present before the plant
closure. As columns (2) and (3) of Table A19 in the Appendix show, OLS estimates with and without firm-
fixed effects are similar. Second, I allow for heterogeneity in the effect by size, using 20 and 100 employees
two years before the closure as size cutoffs.20 Table A19 of the Appendix shows the estimated coefficients.
For each firm located close to a closing plant I calculate the estimated difference in the period after the
closure by subtracting the counterfactual employment level from the observed employment. Then I add up
the differences to the level of each case. Firm-level counterfactuals are given by
ycit =
yˆit
eβ7Size groupi
|(Treated = 1, After = 1), (5)
where yˆit is the predicted employment for firm i in event-year t, β7 is a vector of coefficients on the
interaction terms of treated location indicator, after closure period indicator and the size group indicators,
Size groupi. I use bootstrap to estimate a confidence interval for the aggregate effects. I find, that in
the average case 354 new jobs are created among the incumbent firms 3 years after the closure. As the
average number of people being laid off from a single plant is 341, this means that local firms absorb the
laid-offs 3 years after the closure. Still, estimates are very noisy, the 95% bootstrap confidence interval is
(-189, 897), and there is a large heterogeneity across cases. The aggregate effect of the median case is -187,
and I estimate a negative aggregate effect in 27 out of the 41 cases, 22 located in small cities, though only
3 of them are significantly negative. A negative aggregate effect suggests that total employment losses in
the local economy are larger than the initial layoff due to the plant closure. In additional 11 cases the
aggregate effect on incumbents’ employment is positive but significantly lower than the size of the initial
layoff, suggesting a negative total effect on local employment. As a comparison, Gathmann et al. (2015)
find, that the employment reduction was 3.7% of local employment four years after the layoffs. This is
about twice as large as the size of the initial layoffs in their sample, which accounted for about 1.9% of local
employment. At the same time, Jofre-Monseny et al. (2015) find, that the total employment effect is only
30-60% of the direct effect.
It is important to note, that the calculated numbers refers to jobs within 10 km agglomeration. It might
be the case that local people getting unemployed found jobs outside this circle. While there is no sign
of people moving out from these cities, people might travel more to their new workplace, which I cannot
20Experimenting with more size groups suggests that it is not worth to decrease group size by dividing the sample further.
Estimated effects are similar for the groups 20-50 and 50-100, and there are no significant differences between groups 100-200
and above 200 either.
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measure. Additionally, given the large heterogeneity across cases, new entrants might play an important role
in some of the cases, even if I estimate no significant effect on average.
VI.G Robustness checks
In this section I show that the main results are robust to several specification changes. First, I include trends
in the main specification as I presented in equation 4. Table A20 of the Appendix shows that pre-closure
trends are significantly different in treated and control locations. Still, the average decrease in sales remains
significant even after controlling for pre-trend differences. At the same time, the effect on employment is
not significantly negative any more. Table A21 shows similar results estimating a heterogeneous effect by
industry groups. The employment effect is still significantly larger for firms operating in local services and
in the supplier industry. Estimated effects are not significantly different any more for firms operating in the
same industry as the closing plant, but the patterns are similar to my previous estimates.
Table A22 and A23 of the Appendix show that my results are robust to the exclusion of closures in the
crisis period and in the EU accession years. I consider 2003 and 2004 as EU accession years and 2008 and
2009 as the crisis years. There are 12 cases from EU accession years and 11 cases from closure years. The
number of remaining cases after excluding these two groups is 18. The magnitude of the short-run effects is
somewhat lower and results for firms in the same industry as the closing plant are not significant any more,
but the main patterns stay the same. Similarly, Table A24 and A25 of the Appendix show the results after
excluding those cases where indebtedness played an important role in the plant closure. There are 7 closures
where the press announcements mentioned indebtedness as a crucial factor of the closure. Excluding these
cases, average results become even stronger. Results for local services lose their significance, but the main
patterns stay the same.
As a further robustness check I do the baseline estimates assigning multiple control cities to each treated
city. I take all those cities as controls where a foreign-owned large plant operated in the same 2-digit industry
as the closing plant but did not close. I run weighted regressions, where I create the weights using the distance
of a control city from the treated in terms of propensity scores. Tables A26 and A27 in the Appendix present
the results for all local firms and by industry categories. As the controls are less comparable to the treated,
some of the estimated coefficients lose their significance, but the main patterns remain the same. Local firms
sell less after the plant closure, firms in the local service industry lose more than the average firm, and firms
in the same industry as the closing plant gain on average.
Finally, I look at the baseline effects in a different agglomeration. I take the 20 km radius agglomeration
around treated and control cities, excluding the 10 km radius agglomeration I used so far. This shows if
there are significant effects of the plant closure beyond a relatively limited area around the city. Table A28
of the Appendix shows the results. The upper panel of Table A28 suggests that the effect of a plant closure
is highly concentrated in space. There are no significant differences between the 10-20 km areas surrounding
treated and control locations. The lower panel of Table A28 shows similar patterns separately for different
industry groups of the local firms. Yet, firms in the same industry as the closing plant seem to be affected
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negatively, and supplier-industry firms have lower productivity in treated locations. At the same time, most
of these effects are only marginally significant.
VII Conclusion
In this paper I look at the effect of large foreign-owned plant closures on nearby firms. For this I use
a difference-in-differences approach by comparing firms located near the closing plant and in comparable
areas, comparing outcomes before and after the plant closure. I assign control locations to each case using
propensity score matching. I find that overall, there is a significantly negative effect on sales and employment.
These negative effects are significant even 4-5 years after the plant closure. Foreign-owned local firms are
able to benefit from the closures. Low productivity and small firms are hurt the most. Effects are larger in
smaller cities and locations with worse economic conditions. Firms providing local services or operating in
supplier industries of the closing plant are hurt more than average by the plant closure. This pattern is in
line with two potential channels: decreasing local purchasing power and lost input/output linkages. Firms
in the same industry as the closing plant seem to gain from the closure. This result suggests that some of
the local firms can benefit from the increasing local labor supply. Concerning aggregate effect, there is a
large heterogeneity across cases. As a result I cannot find a negative aggregate effect on average, but small
cities seem to lose even when looking at aggregates.
As I next step I plan to involve linked employer-employee data in the analysis. With the help of this
database I will be able to check if laid-off employees of the closing plants were indeed predominantly employed
by firms operating in the same industry. I can also investigate wage effects more precisely, accounting for
composition changes in the employees of the affected firms.
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Appendix A - A simple model on the effect of a plant closure
The original model is from Acemoglu et al. (2015), based on the model of Long and Plosser (1983). Here I
present a simplified and somewhat modified version, neglecting government purchases (G = 0 and T = 0).
There is an economy with n sectors. Each sector is perfectly competitive, zero profit condition applies. Each
sector has a Cobb-Douglas production technology, using labor (li) and the output of other sectors (xij) as
input. The production function of sector i is
yi = e
zi l
αli
i
n∏
j=1
x
αij
ij , (6)
with αli > 0 and αij ≥ 0. There is a representative household supplying labor (l) and consuming production
goods (ci) with a Cobb-Douglas utility function
u = γ(l)
n∏
i=1
cβii , (7)
where ∂γ(l)∂l ≤ 0, βi ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
βi = 1, and the budget constraint is
n∑
i=1
pici = wl. (8)
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Decision makers (producers and the representative household) take prices as given.
Compared to Acemoglu et al. (2015) I make two modifications in the model. First, I assume that there is
decreasing returns to scale in production, i.e. αli +
n∑
j=1
αij < 1, ∀i. Second, I assume a small open economy,
trading with the rest of the world, including other parts of the country and foreign countries as well. Sales
within the location occur at a price pi, and the world price is fixed at p
w
i . I also assume that there is a
positive iceberg-type transport cost for both exports (τx) and imports (τm). As local players are small,
transport cost should be paid by them, and foreign transaction partners earn or pay exactly the world price.
Then a local importer of a product of sector i has to pay pwi + τm and a local exporter in sector i receives
pwi − τx. Local buyers choose to import the product of sector i if pwi + τm ≤ pi, and local sellers of sector i
choose to export their product if pi ≤ pwi − τx. Let pei denote the equilibrium local price of sector i’s product
in case of a closed economy. If pei < p
w
i − τx, then after opening up the local price will be pi = pwi − τx and
there will be exports in sector i (local supply exceeding local demand). If pei > p
w
i + τm, then after opening
up the local price will be pi = p
w
i + τm and there will be imports in sector i (local demand exceeding local
supply). Otherwise the local price will remain pi = p
e
i and there will be no trade with the rest of the world
(local supply being equal to local demand). I assume that any amount can be exported or imported at the
world price (equivalently, supply and demand in the local economy is small relative to the rest of the world).
There is no mobility of labor, the labor market clearing condition is
l =
n∑
i=1
li. (9)
The market clearing condition in the goods market is
yi = ci +
n∑
j=1
xji + nxi, (10)
where nxi denotes net exports in sector i. For a non-tradable sector nxi = 0 and the goods market condition
of the Acemoglu et al. (2015) paper still applies.
I assume that the closing plant’s sector (denoted by i) is an exporter, i.e. pi = p
w
i − τx and nxi > 0. I also
assume that there is relatively low local demand for sector i’s product and its export share is large.
The equilibrium conditions are given by the input demand functions from the profit maximization problem
li = α
l
i
piyi
w
, ∀i (11)
xij = αij
piyi
pj
, ∀i, j, (12)
the labor supply function from the household’s optimization problem
−γ
′(l)l
γ(l)
= 1, (13)
and the consumer’s demand for goods from the household’s optimization problem
ci = βi
wl
pi
, (14)
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As in the original model, the labor supply function is independent of w or p.
I model a plant closure in sector i as a decrease in the productivity of sector i, i.e. dzi < 0.
21 As in the
original model, from the production function we get that after a drop in productivity the supply of sector
i decreases. As sector i was an exporter before, selling at price pi = p
w
i − τx, and local demand for sector
i’s product is low, the price won’t change.22 This results in decreasing revenues of sector i. The few local
buyers can buy the product of sector i at the same price as before, so there is no downward propagation.
As sector i produces lower quantity on unchanged price pwi − τx, it will decrease its demand for inputs xij
and li. Supplier industries will get a negative demand-side shock, resulting in an upward propagation of the
original shock. This is the channel of ”input/output linkages”. In this model only those supplier industries
are hurt which didn’t export before, as demand from the rest of the world substitutes for the lost local
demand. Additionally, if there are imports in an industry and local supply is relatively low, a moderate drop
in local demand will not affect the price, neither the quantity. In all the other cases (i.e. non-exporter and
relatively low-scale importer industries) both equilibrium price and quantity decreases.
Demand for labor decreases, both by industry i and by the supplier industries. As labor supply is fixed,
wage should either go down for a new equilibrium in the labor market, or there will be unemployment if the
wage cannot decrease to its new equilibrium level. In any case, the income of the household decreases. If
wage can adjust to some extent, labor will be cheaper for production and will be used more intensively by
local firms. This is the effect of ”increased local labor supply”. As the income of the household decreases,
the household budget constraint will tighten, and consumption from all sectors will decrease. This is the
channel of ”decreased local purchasing power”, which affects the non-trading industries like local services.
Appendix B - Additional figures and tables
21Alternatively, I can model a plant closure as an exogenous decrease in the production of sector i. Results remain the same.
22The price could increase if local supply decreases so much that the new closed-economy equilibrium price is higher than
the export price, but lower than the import price. Still, equilibrium quantity produced (yi) would decrease even in that case.
Then similar results would hold, but there would also be downward propagation of the shock.
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Figure A1: The number of cases per event-year which have settlement-level or firm-level data
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Figure A2: Case-level averages of the log of total employment and sales within 10 km agglomeration, ex-
cluding the closing plant, by size group
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(a) Log sales of firms with more than 100 employees
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(d) Log employment of firms with 5-20 employees
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Figure A3: Case-level averages of the log of total employment and sales within 10 km agglomeration, ex-
cluding the closing plant, by industry
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Figure A4: The yearly evolution of average log sales and employment in treated and control firms, with
95% confidence interval on the treated-control difference, and controls normalized to zero one year before
the closure
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Figure A5: The average move-out rate in treated and control cities around the plant closure
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Table A1: The list of treated and control cities with attributes
city city size plant employees city city size plant employees
NACE 1.1 - 15: Manufacture of food products and beverages
Nagykanizsa 33910 Dreher 289 Keszthely 13414 Helikorn 182 1999 Dec
Sárvár 10106 Magyar Cukor (Agrana) 350 Siófok 14709 Sió Eckes 148 1999 Q1
Jászberény 16972 Corona 180 Keszthely 13150 Helikorn 187 2003 Jan
Zagyvarékas 2204 Hajdú-Bét 800 Szerencs 6318
Szerencsi Cukorgyár                          
(Béghin-Say SA)
263 2002
Pásztó 6043 Sole 110 Karcag 13209 Cargill 193 2004 Q1
Pécs 93118 MiZo 238 Baja 22682 Bácska Agráripari Rt 118 2005 Oct
Kaba 3924 Eastern Sugar 200 Szeged 100312 SOLE-MiZo 1380 2006 Q4
Nagybánhegyes 860 Friesland 183 Zichyújfalu 617 Provimi 182 2007 Sept
Szolnok 46539 Mátra Cukor (Nordzucker) 150 Baja 22662
Csabai Tartósipari Rt 
(Globus)
175 2007 Nov
Mezőhegyes 3901 Eastern Sugar 224 Siófok 14709 Sió Eckes 143 1997 Dec
Sarkad 6418 Eastern Sugar 239 Lajosmizse 6750 Olivia 160 1998 March
NACE 1.1 - 16: Manufacture of tobacco products
*Debrecen 128575 Reemtsma 380 2004 Apr
*Eger 34996 Philip Morris 334 2005 May
NACE 1.1 - 17: Manufacture of textiles
Szombathely 52105 Savatex 200 Dombóvár 12874 Pasha 735 2001
Dunaújváros 32382 Berwin 240 Dombóvár 12480 Pasha 344 2005 Dec
Kaposvár 40932 Coats 195 Tolna 7345 Tolnatext 247 2007 Nov
NACE 1.1 - 18: Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
*Zalaegerszeg 38733 ZA-KO 1200 2002 Dec
Bátonyterenye 9090 Hammer 160 Zalaszentgrót 4706 SH Rekord 219 2003 July
Mezőkövesd 10423 Ruhaipari Szövetkezet 252 Zalaszentgrót 4706 SH Rekord 219 2003
Ajka 20450 Shoe Makers 175 Zalaszentgrót 4706 SH Rekord 219 2003 Okt
Vasvár 2842 Styl 160 Rajka 1704 Calida 298 2003 Q4
Marcali 7738 Mustang 371 Nagykálló 6430 Olimpias 379 2007 March
Kiskunhalas 18228 Levi Strauss 549 Zalaszentgrót 4515 SH Rekord 212 2009 June
Nyíregyháza 74946 Berwin 395 Zalaszentgrót 4515 SH Rekord 212 2009 Jan
Várpalota 13537 Berwin 162 Zalaszentgrót 4586 SH Rekord 212 2008 Sept
industry
treated control
closure date
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Table A2: The list of treated and control cities with attributes - continued
city city size plant employees city city size plant employees
NACE 1.1 - 19: Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
Bonyhád 9029 Salamander 640 Martfű 4555 Lorenz 706 2003 Oct
*Szeged 100743 Mary 2000 220 2003 Q3
Tiszakeszi 1648 Mary 2000 242 Martfű 4555 Lorenz 706 2003 Aug
Beled 1806 Marc 200 Martfű 4555 Lorenz 706 2003 Q3
*Körmend 7875 Marc 250 2003 Oct
Őriszentpéter 793 Marc 200 Martfű 4516 Lorenz 638 2006 Jan
**Szombathely 50520 Marc 1010 2004 Q4
Vasvár 2811 Richter 180 Martfű 4418 Lorenz 654 2008 March
NACE 1.1 - 21: Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
Lábatlan 3232 Piszke Papír (Zeritis) 263 Ács 4250 Hartmann 496 2008 Dec
Szolnok 46078 Mondi 265 Ács 4290 Hartmann 488 2008 June
NACE 1.1 - 25: Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
Komárom 12118 Perlos 1100 Szeged 100977 ContiTech 436 2009 July
NACE 1.1 - 26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
Bélapátfalva 2086 PannonCem 200 Nyergesújfalu 4926 Eternit 182 2000 Sept
Salgótarján 23568 R-Glass 268 Tapolca 10569 Rockwool 183 2009 Nov
NACE 1.1 - 27: Manufacture of basic metals
Miskolc 103155 DAM 2004 878 Ózd 22375 ÓAM 470 2009 March
NACE 1.1 - 29: Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
Szentgotthárd 5551 GFP Mezőgépgyár 150 Mezőtúr 11428 RAFI 212 2003 Sept
NACE 1.1 - 30: Manufacture of office machinery and computers
**Székesfehérvár 65420 IBM Data Storage Systems 3700 2003 Q1
NACE 1.1 - 31: Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
Szeged 102218 Kábelgyár (Siemens) 245 Szentes 18877 Legrand 595 1998 Q3
Szombathely 50520 Philips 800 Gyöngyös 20175 Magnetec 230 2004 Sept
Eger 34396 Leoni 627 Gyöngyös 19286 Magnetec 260 2008 Aug
NACE 1.1 - 32: Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
Sárbogárd 8012 Mannesmann 845 Tiszakécske 6940 Hechinger 310 2000 Oct
Tatabánya 43682 Artesyn 370 Tiszakécske 6943 Hechinger 193 2005 Q4
Kecskemét 68006 DDDK (Bosch) 500 Lőrinci 3499 Bumjin 448 2009 July
*Szombathely 48189 Laird 700 2009 Q2
NACE 1.1 - 34: Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
Székesfehérvár 65420 Ikarusbus 187 Rétság 1985 Enbi 250 2003 Aug
industry
treated control
closure date
City size is given one year before the plant closure or in 2000 if closure occured before 2001. Plant size is also given around that time when information is available. Plant closures marked by a * 
are not involved in the final analysis as no comparable control locations could be matched. Plant closures marked by ** are jointly forming a case with another closure happening in the same city 
and in the same year.
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Table A3: Why plants closed?
city name country of the owner why did the plant close?
Ajka Shoe Makers Italy (Carmens Holding) costs (goes to Romania)
Bátonyterenye Hammer Germany costs 
Bélapátfalva PannonCem 
Switzerland (Holderbank) 
and Germany (Heidelberger 
Zement AG)
market considerations
Beled Marc Switzerland (MSC Group) costs, demand (imports from India)
Bonyhád Bonsa Germany (Salamander) losses, restructuring activities
Debrecen Reemtsma UK (Imperial Tobacco Group)tax increase, demand, EU-accession
Dunaújváros Berwin UK cheap competition
Eger Leoni Germany costs, low prices (goes to Poland)
Eger Philip Morris USA tax increase, demand, EU-accession
Jászberény Corona Switzerland (Delimpex) market conditions
Kaba Eastern Sugar
UK (Tate&Lyle) and France 
(Saint Louis Sucre)
EU accession
Kaposvár Coats UK
costs, demand (imports from Africa and 
Asia)
Kecskemét Digital Disc Drives Germany (Bosch) crisis, demand
Kiskunhalas Levi Strauss USA cheap competition, demand
Komárom Perlos Taiwan crisis, demand
Körmend Marc Switzerland (MSC Group)
costs, demand and legal issues (imports 
from Asia)
Lábatlan Piszke Greece (Zeritis-group) making losses
Marcali Mustang Germany costs, restructuring activities
Mezőkövesd
Ruhaipari 
Szövetkezet
Mezőhegyes Eastern Sugar
UK (Tate&Lyle) and France 
(Saint Louis Sucre)
EU accession
Miskolc DAM 2004
Ukraine and Switzerland 
(Donbass-group)
crisis, demand
Nagybánhegyes Friesland The Netherlands concentrate production (to Debrecen)
Nagykanizsa Dreher The Netherlands (Fienierr) concentrate production (to Kőbánya)
Nyíregyháza Berwin UK crisis
Őriszentpéter Marc Switzerland (MSC Group) costs, demand (imports from India)
Pásztó Sole Italy
EU accession, concentrate production (to 
Szeged)
Pécs MiZo Cyprus
concentrate production (to Szeged), low 
prices
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Table A4: Why plants closed? - continued
city name country of the owner why did the plant close?
Salgótarján R-GLASS Slovakia debts
Sárbogárd Mannesmann Germany costs (goes to China)
Sarkad Eastern Sugar
UK (Tate&Lyle) and France 
(Saint Louis Sucre)
EU accession
Sárvár Magyar Cukor Austria (Agrana) EU accession
Szeged kábelgyár Germany (Siemens) demand, restructuring activities
Szeged MARY 2000 Italy debts
Székesfehérvár IBM Germany global demand
Székesfehérvár Ikarusbus Italy (IrisBus - Iveco) competition, lost demand, bad management
Szentgotthárd GFP Mezőgépgyár Germany (Küpa) relocation (goes to Latvia)
Szolnok Mátra Cukor Germany (Nordzucker AG) EU accession
Szolnok Mondi international enterprise low demand, competition
Szombathely Philips The Netherlands relocation (to Székesfehérvár and China)
Szombathely Marc Switzerland (MSC Holding) low demand, high costs, relocation (to China)
Szombathely Savatex debts
Szombathely Laird UK lost demand, relocation (to China and Mexico)
Tatabánya Artesyn USA lost demand, relocating buyers (to Romania)
Tiszakeszi Mary 2000 Italy debts
Várpalota Berwin UK high costs, recession, drop in demand
Vasvár Styl Germany (Bäumler) concentrate production (to Szombathely)
Vasvár Richter Austria competition, high costs, relocation (to Slovakia)
Zagyvarékas Hajdu-Bét debts, competition
Zalaegerszeg Za-Ko Austria debts
41
Table A5: Pre-closure similarity of treated and controls when multiple controls are assigned to each case
Pre-closure characteristics
Average for 
treated
Average for 
controls
P-value of H0: 
treated=control
0.23
(0.02)
0.81
(0.14)
0.01
(0.05)
-0.0081
(0.0043)
0.0041
(0.0036)
0.0014
(0.0016)
0.0001
(0.0012)
0.009
(0.007)
0.006
(0.009)
0.049
(0.088)
-0.001
(0.005)
Propensity score
Log working-age 
.population in city
Log working-age 
.population in 30 km
Unemployment rate                
.in city 
Unemployment rate               
.in 30 km
0.074
0.072
2-year change in city 
.unemployment rate (pp)
2-year change in 30 km 
.unemployment rate (pp)
Buyer-industry share              
.in 30 km
0.0012
0.0012
0.081
Supplier-industry share          
.in 30 km
Log total sales in 30 km
Average sales growth            
.in 30 km
0.116
19.23
0.131
Controls are cities with a foreign-owned large firm operating in the same industry as the closing plant. 
Regressions are weighted by the normalized distance of the controls' propensity score from the treated. 
Weights of controls within a case sum up to one. Pre-closure characteristics are measured one year before 
the plant closure. 2-year change in the unemployment rate refers to changes from t-3 to t-1 where t is the 
year of the plant closure, and it is expressed in percentage points. Working-age population refers to the 
number of people aged 18-59 on Dec. 31. of the given year.  Unemployment rate is the number of registered 
unemployed on Dec. 20. of the given year, divided by the working-age population. Buyer-industry share is the 
employment share of firms operating in the buyer industries of the closing plant in total employment. 
Supplier-industry share is defined analogously. Buyers are industries which use more than 5% of the closing 
plant industry's output, suppliers are industries of which more than 5% of the closing plant industry's inputs 
come. Total sales and average sales growth is calculated omitting the closing plant's firm and the foreign-
owned large firms in the control cities. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Controls: multiple controls are matched to each case
0.31
9.44
11.80
0.065
0.068
0.0026
0.0013
0.090
0.122
19.28
0.130
0.08
8.63
11.78
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Table A6: The list of supplier industries
List of supplier industries by 2-digit industry
15.  Manufacture of food products and beverages
1. Agriculture, hunting and related service activities
51. Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
74. Other business activities
16. Manufacture of tobacco products
1. Agriculture, hunting and related service activities
21. Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
24. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
51. Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
74. Other business activities
92. Recreational, cultural and sporting activities
17. Manufacture of textiles
18. Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
24. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
36. Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
40. Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
18. Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
17. Manufacture of textiles
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
51. Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
74. Other business activities
19. Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear
17. Manufacture of textiles
18. Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
74. Other business activities
21. Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
40. Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
51. Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
25. Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
24. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
74. Other business activities
26. Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
14. Other mining and quarrying
23. Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
24. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
40. Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
45. Construction
51. Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
60. Land transport; transport via pipelines
74. Other business activities
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Table A7: The list of supplier industries - continued
List of supplier industries by 2-digit industry
27. Manufacture of basic metal
23. Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
40. Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
51. Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
29. Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
27. Manufacture of basic metal
28. Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
51. Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
74. Other business activities
30. Manufacture of office machinery and computers
32. Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
74. Other business activities
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
25. Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
27. Manufacture of basic metal
28. Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
32. Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
74. Other business activities
32. Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
34. Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
28. Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29. Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
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Table A8: The list of buyer industries
List of buyer industries by 2-digit industry
15.  Manufacture of food products and beverages
1. Agriculture, hunting and related service activities
5. Fishing,  fish farming and related service activities
55. Hotels and restaurants
85. Health and social work
16. Manufacture of tobacco products
-
17. Manufacture of textiles
18. Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
19. Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear
18. Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
17. Manufacture of textiles
19. Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear
19. Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear
36. Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
21. Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
16. Manufacture of tobacco products
22. Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
25. Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
33. Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
45. Construction
85. Health and social work
26. Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
14. Other mining and quarrying
45. Construction
27. Manufacture of basic metal
10. Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
28. Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29. Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
35. Manufacture of other transport equipment
37. Recycling
29. Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
14. Other mining and quarrying
34. Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30. Manufacture of office machinery and computers
-
11. Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction, .      
excluding surveying
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Table A9: The list of buyer industries - continued
List of buyer industries by 2-digit industry
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
18. Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
29. Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
32. Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
33. Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clock
34. Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35. Manufacture of other transport equipment
32. Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
30. Manufacture of office machinery and computers
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
33. Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clock
34. Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
50. Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel
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Table A10: The average number of firms per case in different industry categories
Table A11: Descriptive statistics of firms
Variable Mean
Standad 
deviation
Number of 
observations
sales (1000HUF) 450,915 4,325,328 796,655
employment (capita) 35 266 782,759
per capita yearly wage 
(1000 HUF)
552 549 714,197
value added per capita 
(1000 HUF)
2,502 11,402 733,660
total factor productivity 11,587 263,081 719,239
export sales (1000 HUF) 119,340 1,868,755 686,861
exitor dummy 0.10 0.30 797,551
age (years) 8.9 7.4 797,551
capital to labor ratio 6,111 297,261 757,124
Descriptive statistics are based on the largest sample of firms used in the analysis: all 
firms within the 30 km agglomeration of treated and control cities, when I assign 
multiple controls to each case. As in the analysis, I exclude the firms of the closing 
plants and the foreign-owned large firms in the control cities. I also exclude firms with 
sales in the highest 0.5 percentile. I only include firms with a median employment of at 
least five. Age is winsorized from above at 65.
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Table A12: Heterogeneity of the effect by the size of local firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
-0.076* -0.031 -0.019* -0.007 -0.007 -0.001
(0.040) (0.029) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003)
-0.046 -0.023 0.005 0.011 -0.020 -0.008
(0.035) (0.021) (0.022) (0.009) (0.019) (0.005)
0.068 0.010 -0.001 -0.011 0.042 0.001
(0.112) (0.091) (0.050) (0.025) (0.027) (0.013)
0.639 0.582* -0.021 0.014 0.219 0.022
(0.422) (0.300) (0.081) (0.022) (0.267) (0.017)
-0.057 -0.022 -0.031 -0.002 0.006 -0.005
(0.058) (0.040) (0.021) (0.022) (0.008) (0.004)
-0.126** -0.070 0.006 0.010 -0.044 0.004
(0.052) (0.042) (0.029) (0.016) (0.030) (0.007)
-0.039 -0.033 -0.010 -0.025 0.044 0.012
(0.124) (0.133) (0.063) (0.032) (0.041) (0.018)
0.623 0.542* 0.281 0.198 0.116 0.016
(0.545) (0.299) (0.247) (0.199) (0.315) (0.018)
Size group dummies in interactions YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 359,826 353,768 326,784 330,158 353,607 332,702
Number of unique firms 26,434 26,512 25,914 26,142 26,527
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and 
foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. Size(5-20) is an indicator of those firms which had 5-20 employees 2 years before the closure. Size(20-100), 
size(100-500) and size(500-) are defined in a similar way. All the other right-hand side variables are included only in interactions with the size group dummies. 
Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) 
and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Far-away periods refer to separate 
dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the 
period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column 
(6), case and calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP 
and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, 
in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(1-3) x Size(500-)
Treated x After(4-5) x Size(5-20)
Treated x After(1-3) x Size(5-20)
Treated x After(1-3) x Size(20-100)
Treated x After(1-3) x Size(100-500)
Treated x After(4-5) x Size(20-100)
Treated x After(4-5) x Size(100-500)
Treated x After(4-5) x Size(500-)
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Table A13: The number of cases by different categorizations
Number of cases per categories
low high
low 14 15
high 5 7
low high
small 10 14
large 3 11
Unemployment rate in 30 km 
agglomeration 2 years before 
the plant closure
Population of the city 1 year 
before the plant closure
Export share of the closing 
plant
Size of the closing plant
Table A14: Differences in the plant closure effect by characteristics of the closing plant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
-0.069*** -0.047*** -0.026** -0.023*** -0.006 0.001
(0.024) (0.017) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003)
-0.099*** -0.088*** -0.013 -0.025** 0.004 -0.002
(0.029) (0.024) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.004)
-0.020 0.027 0.016 0.023** -0.017 0.003
(0.038) (0.026) (0.019) (0.011) (0.016) (0.005)
-0.014 0.045 -0.006 0.021 -0.024 0.007
(0.053) (0.037) (0.028) (0.024) (0.023) (0.007)
Number of observations 328,604 322,860 298,490 301,525 322,823 303,817
Number of unique firms 25,816 25,894 25,306 25,533 25,903
-0.055** -0.023 -0.017 -0.011* -0.008 0.002
(0.027) (0.016) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003)
-0.080** -0.055** -0.015 -0.008 -0.000 0.002
(0.033) (0.022) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004)
-0.019 -0.023 0.017 0.009 0.006 0.001
(0.036) (0.022) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004)
0.001 0.013 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004
(0.055) (0.034) (0.028) (0.019) (0.018) (0.006)
Number of observations 359,826 353,768 326,784 330,158 353,607 332,702
Number of unique firms 26,434 26,512 25,914 26,142 26,527
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
Treated x After(1-3) x HighExpShare
Treated x After(4-5) x HighExpShare
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and 
foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four 
separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant 
closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the 
period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. HighExpShare is an 
indicator of those cases where the closing plant's export share was more than 50% 2 years before the closure. LargePlant is a dummy for cases where the closing 
plant has more than 300 employees. Interactions of the case group dummy with all the other right-hand side variables are also included. Fixed effects for firm (or 
2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. Column (6) includes firm-year-level characteristics as log employment, age, log 
capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In 
columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** 
p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
Treated x After(4-5) x LargePlant
Treated x After(1-3) x LargePlant
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Table A15: Differences in the plant closure effect by the share of the closing plant in the local economy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var.:
Case group:
baseline
plant share> 
median
plant share> 
15% of 10km 
employment
baseline
plant share> 
median
plant share> 
15% of 10km 
employment
-0.061*** -0.041 -0.054*** -0.030** -0.015 -0.033***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.019) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012)
-0.077** -0.033 -0.058** -0.049** -0.022 -0.046**
(0.030) (0.034) (0.027) (0.019) (0.025) (0.020)
-0.040 -0.052 -0.024 0.034
(0.038) (0.076) (0.030) (0.060)
-0.070 -0.102 -0.026 0.004
(0.055) (0.072) (0.038) (0.068)
Treated, time period and case group 
...dummies, also in interactions
YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE, case FE, calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 359,826 359,826 359,826 353,768 353,768 353,768
Number of unique firms 26,434 26,434 26,434 26,512 26,512 26,512
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and foreing-owned 
large firms in the control locations. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four separate time period 
dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Far-away periods refer 
to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the 
period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Group indicator refers to those cases where the share of the closing plant 
in the local economy is larger than the median share in columns (2) and (5) or larger than 15% in columns (3) and (6). Share is defined as the size of the closing plant 
compared to the total employment of all other firms within 10 km of the plant. Case group dummies are also interacted with all other indicators. Fixed effects for firm, case 
and calendar year are also included. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(1-3) x Group
Treated x After(4-5) x Group
Log sales Log employment
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
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Table A16: Differences in the plant closure effect by the industry of the closing plant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
-0.063* -0.042* -0.025 -0.002 -0.003 0.002
(0.038) (0.024) (0.020) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004)
-0.012 -0.017 0.007 -0.020* -0.000 0.000
(0.037) (0.034) (0.025) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006)
-0.052 0.006 0.018 -0.010 -0.039* -0.003
(0.051) (0.035) (0.029) (0.020) (0.023) (0.006)
0.043 0.042 0.020 0.009 0.011 0.001
(0.053) (0.037) (0.024) (0.017) (0.016) (0.006)
-0.096 -0.046 -0.016 0.001 -0.017 0.006
(0.091) (0.052) (0.031) (0.025) (0.034) (0.011)
0.009 -0.061 0.017 -0.016 0.030 -0.007
(0.089) (0.056) (0.036) (0.027) (0.034) (0.011)
-0.053 -0.011 0.005 -0.007 -0.028 -0.006
(0.095) (0.056) (0.034) (0.027) (0.033) (0.010)
0.026 0.039 -0.033 -0.021 0.023 0.002
(0.093) (0.055) (0.034) (0.027) (0.036) (0.010)
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Treated x Far-away period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry group dummies in interactions YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 359,826 353,768 326,784 330,158 353,607 332,702
Number of unique firms 26,434 26,512 25,914 26,142 26,527
Treated x After(4-5) x Textile&Leather
Treated x After(4-5) x Machinery&Equipment
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and foreing-owned 
large firms in the control locations. Food, Textile&Leather and Machinery&Equipment indicate cases with a closing plant in the corresponding industry. The other right-hand 
side variables are also interacted with the industry group dummies. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include 
four separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant 
closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] 
and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry 
instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log 
TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in 
cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(1-3) x Food
Treated x After(1-3) x Textile&Leather
Treated x After(1-3) x Machinery&Equipment
Treated x After(4-5)
Treated x After(4-5) x Food
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Table A17: Differences in the plant closure effect by the owner of the closing plant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales
log 
employment
log labor 
productivity
log per capita 
wage
log TFP exit
-0.071 -0.048** 0.000 0.003 0.030** 0.004
(0.054) (0.021) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.005)
0.024 -0.014 -0.035 -0.043 0.075** 0.004
(0.065) (0.048) (0.046) (0.029) (0.033) (0.012)
0.039 0.034 -0.019 -0.006 -0.045 -0.002
(0.049) (0.029) (0.022) (0.012) (0.028) (0.006)
-0.063 -0.016 0.023 0.033 -0.088* -0.003
(0.068) (0.053) (0.050) (0.041) (0.047) (0.014)
-0.059 -0.013 -0.010 -0.030** -0.048*** -0.004
(0.058) (0.029) (0.024) (0.013) (0.018) (0.007)
-0.180** -0.088 0.003 0.025 -0.079** 0.003
(0.079) (0.055) (0.049) (0.034) (0.037) (0.013)
0.025 0.036 0.002 0.006 -0.036 -0.002
(0.070) (0.041) (0.026) (0.014) (0.026) (0.007)
-0.092 -0.036 0.022 0.041 -0.087* -0.002
(0.081) (0.073) (0.053) (0.032) (0.047) (0.013)
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Treated x Far-away period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Foreign dummy in interactions YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 334,980 329,436 304,092 307,301 328,871 309,317
Number of unique firms 25,417 25,491 24,921 25,130 25,482
Treated x After(1-3) x Mediterranean
Treated x After(4-5) x Mediterranean
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and foreing-
owned large firms in the control locations. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four separate time 
period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Far-away 
periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and 
After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. German-speaking, UK & the Netherlands 
and Mediterranean are indicators for a closing plant with owners from specific country groups. German-speaking refers to Germany, Austria and Switzerland, 
Mediterranean refers to Italy, Greece and Cyprus. Owner group dummies are also interacted with all other indicators. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead 
in column (6)), case and calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log 
TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, 
in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(4-5) x German-speaking
Treated x After(1-3) x UK & the Netherlands
Treated x After(4-5) x UK & the Netherlands
Treated x After(1-3) 
Treated x After(4-5) 
Treated x After(1-3) x German-speaking
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Table A18: Different characteristics of plant closures by country group
Case group by the owner:
German-
speaking
UK & the 
Netherands
Mediterranean Others
Number of cases 18 9 6 8
Industry share Food & tobacco 0.22 0.44 0.33 0.13
Machinery  & equipment 0.28 0.11 0.17 0.13
Paper & materials 0.11 0 0.17 0.38
Textile & shoe 0.39 0.44 0.33 0.38
Average years of operation 12.2 13.7 11.5 11.8
Average years of operation as foreign 10 11.4 10 10
Share of cases where city size < 40,000 0.79 0.67 0.67 0.63
German-speaking group refers to owners from Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Mediterranean group refers to owners from Italy, 
Greece and Cyprus. Others refer to owners from Taiwan, the USA and multinationals without a clear source country. The employment 
within 10 km agglomeration is calculated one year before the plant closure and excludes the closing plant. City size and pre-closure 
unemployment rate also refer to data one year before the plant closure.
Share of cases where plant size compared to 
...the employment within 10km < 15%
0.68 0.78 0.83 0.88
Share of cases with above median                
...pre-closure unemployment rate 
0.53 0.56 0.5 0.63
Table A19: Comparing OLS and Poisson estimates by size groups for the aggregation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All firms
Dep. var.: Employment
Regression: Poisson
-0.031*** -0.032** -0.027*** -0.052**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.025)
0.006 0.007 0.010 0.046
(0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.031)
0.100 0.101 0.077 0.123
(0.067) (0.068) (0.059) (0.077)
-0.037** -0.035* -0.025* -0.016
(0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.028)
-0.040 -0.045 0.000 0.003
(0.041) (0.043) (0.034) (0.041)
0.041 0.035 0.008 0.119
(0.101) (0.103) (0.093) (0.114)
Treated, time period and case group 
...dummies, also in interactions
YES YES YES YES
Case and year FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES NO NO
Observations 372,121 276,514 276,514 276,514
Number of unique firms 27,787 15,090
Treated x After(4-5)
Treated x After(4-5) x Size(20-100)
Treated x After(4-5) x Size(100-)
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding 
very large firms, firms with a closing plant and foreing-owned large firms in the control locations.  In columns (2)-
(4) only firms already existing before the plant closure are included. Treated is an indicator of firms being located 
in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-
5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant 
closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 
years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also 
include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Size(20-100) refers to firms with 20-
100 employees two years before the closure, Size(100-) refers to firms with more than 100 employees. Size group 
dummies are also interacted with all other indicators. Fixed effects for case (firm in column (1) and calendar year 
are also included. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(3) 
standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (4) I show robust standard errors. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Firms existing before the closure
Log employment
OLS 
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(1-3) x Size(20-100)
Treated x After(1-3) x Size(100-)
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Table A20: Baseline estimates, controlling for pre-trend differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
0.019 -0.036 -0.021 0.012 -0.011 0.002
(0.074) (0.035) (0.036) (0.014) (0.024) (0.002)
-0.009* -0.007** -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
-0.032** -0.004 -0.011 -0.007 -0.009* 0.001
(0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002*
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 215,248 213,011 196,210 200,808 211,906 201,259
Number of unique firms 21,687 21,685 21,044 21,402 21,692
Treated 
Treated x Trend
Treated x After
Treated x Trend x After
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and 
foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. Observations are included only in the period [t-6,t+5], where t denotes the year of the plant closure.Treated is 
an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. After indicates the period [t+1,t+5]. The baseline time period is [t-6,t]. Trend 
is a simple time trend. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics 
include log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard 
errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
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Table A21: Heterogeneous estimates by industry group, controlling for pre-trend differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
-0.031 0.006 -0.003 -0.007 -0.012 0.003
(0.024) (0.015) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004)
0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002*
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
-0.070 -0.049* -0.047* -0.002 0.001 -0.007
(0.043) (0.026) (0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.006)
0.093 0.148 -0.050 -0.034 0.020 -0.029*
(0.131) (0.105) (0.062) (0.038) (0.069) (0.015)
-0.068 -0.098* 0.006 -0.001 -0.017 0.001
(0.054) (0.055) (0.027) (0.024) (0.021) (0.006)
0.062 0.038 0.060* -0.024 0.049** 0.004
(0.085) (0.053) (0.036) (0.023) (0.025) (0.008)
-0.070** -0.037 -0.011 -0.014 0.002 0.001
(0.035) (0.027) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.004)
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 215,248 213,011 196,210 200,808 211,906 201,259
Number of unique firms 21,687 21,685 21,044 21,402 21,692
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and foreing-
owned large firms in the control locations. Observations are included only in the period [t-6,t+5], where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Treated is an 
indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. After indicates the period [t+1,t+5]. The baseline time period is [t-6,t]. Trend is a 
simple time trend. LocalServices indicate to firms providing local services. Buyer and Supplier indicate firms operating in the buyer or supplier industries of the 
closing plant. Competitor indicates firms operating in the same industry as the closing plant. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and 
calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter 
status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show 
bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After x Trend
Treated x After
Treated x After x LocalServices
Treated x After x Competitor
Treated x After x Supplier
Treated x After x Buyer
Treated x After x Trend
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Table A22: Baseline estimates, excluding EU accession and crisis years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
0.027 0.014 0.009 0.010 -0.002 -0.001
(0.024) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
-0.047* -0.033** -0.010 -0.010 -0.001 0.005
(0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003)
-0.081** -0.064*** -0.019 -0.007 0.007 0.003
(0.033) (0.023) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004)
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Treated x Far-away period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 165,076 162,410 149,905 151,236 162,501 152,682
Number of unique firms 13,682 13,721 13,410 13,523 13,714
Treated
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and 
foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. I exclude those cases where the plant closure occured during the crisis (2008-2009) or around the EU accession 
(2003-2004). Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four separate time period dummies: After(1-
3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Far-away periods refer to 
separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) 
denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead 
in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, 
log TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered 
by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
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Table A23: Heterogeneous estimates by industry group, excluding EU accession and crisis years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
-0.028 0.005 -0.002 -0.010 0.005 0.002
(0.026) (0.018) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004)
-0.016 -0.059* -0.044 0.005 -0.004 0.001
(0.037) (0.031) (0.029) (0.016) (0.013) (0.008)
0.056 0.092 -0.086 -0.060 -0.020 -0.007
(0.134) (0.109) (0.068) (0.058) (0.046) (0.021)
-0.089 -0.173*** 0.068*** 0.033 -0.026 0.001
(0.064) (0.043) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.009)
-0.068 0.021 -0.101** -0.025 -0.057* 0.005
(0.108) (0.068) (0.043) (0.022) (0.031) (0.012)
-0.052 -0.021 -0.023 -0.008 0.012 0.003
(0.034) (0.031) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.005)
-0.026 -0.079** -0.042 0.023 -0.016 -0.009
(0.065) (0.035) (0.034) (0.024) (0.018) (0.010)
-0.074 0.048 0.005 0.038 -0.042 0.030
(0.171) (0.120) (0.067) (0.078) (0.091) (0.027)
-0.182*** -0.210*** 0.045 0.017 -0.023 0.015
(0.069) (0.055) (0.040) (0.031) (0.025) (0.011)
0.010 0.089 0.040 -0.066** -0.021 -0.019
(0.155) (0.111) (0.064) (0.033) (0.034) (0.014)
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Treated x Far-away period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry group dummies in interactions YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 165,076 162,410 149,905 151,236 162,501 152,682
Number of unique firms 13,682 13,721 13,410 13,523 13,714
Treated x After(4-5) x LocalServices
Treated x After(4-5) x Competitor
Treated x After(4-5) x Supplier
Treated x After(4-5) x Buyer
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and foreing-
owned large firms in the control locations. I exclude those cases where the plant closure occured during the crisis (2008-2009) or around the EU accession (2003-
2004). LocalServices indicate to firms providing local services. Buyer and Supplier indicate firms operating in the buyer or supplier industries of the closing plant. 
Competitor indicates firms operating in the same industry as the closing plant. The other right-hand side variables are also interacted with the industry group 
dummies. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four separate time period dummies: After(1-3), 
After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Far-away periods refer to separate 
dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period 
[t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and 
calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter 
status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show 
bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(4-5)
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(1-3) x LocalServices
Treated x After(1-3) x Competitor
Treated x After(1-3) x Supplier
Treated x After(1-3) x Buyer
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Table A24: Baseline estimates, excluding indebted plants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
0.007 0.002 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
-0.070*** -0.041*** -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 0.003
(0.023) (0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002)
-0.072** -0.060*** -0.012 -0.009 0.007 0.004
(0.030) (0.020) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.003)
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Treated x Far-away period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 323,548 318,182 293,684 296,863 317,745 298,933
Number of unique firms 25,025 25,097 24,532 24,744 25,105
Treated
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and 
foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. I exclude those cases where indebtedness played an important role in the closure. Treated is an indicator of 
firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period 
dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 
years before and more than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away 
time period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. 
Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation 
is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in 
column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
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Table A25: Heterogeneous estimates by industry group, excluding indebted plants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
-0.067** -0.031* 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.001
(0.030) (0.017) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003)
-0.023 -0.036 -0.012 -0.007 -0.002 0.000
(0.029) (0.022) (0.021) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006)
0.181 0.234** -0.099 -0.038 -0.018 -0.031*
(0.134) (0.093) (0.065) (0.038) (0.043) (0.016)
-0.054 -0.072* 0.010 -0.001 -0.021 -0.005
(0.044) (0.042) (0.027) (0.019) (0.015) (0.007)
0.067 0.052 -0.024 0.009 0.016 0.010
(0.069) (0.043) (0.035) (0.017) (0.019) (0.008)
-0.066* -0.047 -0.011 -0.009 0.011 0.005
(0.035) (0.030) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004)
-0.017 -0.026 -0.031 0.029 -0.020 -0.010
(0.048) (0.032) (0.031) (0.022) (0.014) (0.008)
0.153 0.228** -0.025 0.002 -0.018 -0.008
(0.156) (0.111) (0.066) (0.062) (0.069) (0.023)
-0.057 -0.110** 0.013 -0.013 -0.036** 0.004
(0.061) (0.054) (0.034) (0.032) (0.017) (0.009)
0.005 0.057 0.034 -0.043 0.021 -0.010
(0.111) (0.083) (0.047) (0.030) (0.025) (0.011)
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Treated x Far-away period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry group dummies in interactions YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 323,548 318,182 293,684 296,863 317,745 298,933
Number of unique firms 25,025 25,097 24,532 24,744 25,105
Treated x After(4-5) x LocalServices
Treated x After(4-5) x Competitor
Treated x After(4-5) x Supplier
Treated x After(4-5) x Buyer
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing plant and foreing-
owned large firms in the control locations. I exclude those cases where indebtedness played an important role in the closure. LocalServices indicate to firms providing 
local services. Buyer and Supplier indicate firms operating in the buyer or supplier industries of the closing plant. Competitor indicates firms operating in the same 
industry as the closing plant. The other right-hand side variables are also interacted with the industry group dummies. Treated is an indicator of firms being located 
in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline 
time period is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more 
than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies 
interacted with the Treated dummy. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level 
characteristics include log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) 
standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(4-5)
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(1-3) x LocalServices
Treated x After(1-3) x Competitor
Treated x After(1-3) x Supplier
Treated x After(1-3) x Buyer
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Table A26: Baseline estimates with multiple controls
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
exit 
0.010 0.005 0.007 0.003 -0.000
(0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
-0.036** -0.015 -0.016** -0.005 0.001
(0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002)
-0.036 -0.021 -0.016 -0.010 0.003
(0.023) (0.018) (0.012) (0.008) (0.002)
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Treated x Far-away period dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO
Number of observations 1,052,303 1,034,647 955,048 964,780 969,656
Treated
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a 
closing plant and foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. Multiple control cities are used, weighted by the distance of propensity 
score estimates from the treated propensity scores. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the closing 
plant. I include four separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-6,t], 
where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more 
than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time 
period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are 
also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly 
exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered 
by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
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Table A27: Heterogeneous estimates by industry group with multiple controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
exit 
-0.024 -0.010 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002
(0.018) (0.014) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002)
-0.057** -0.021 -0.026 -0.005 0.003
(0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.005)
0.159 0.161** -0.064 -0.017 -0.019
(0.104) (0.077) (0.061) (0.029) (0.014)
-0.024 -0.035 0.010 -0.006 0.000
(0.033) (0.035) (0.021) (0.014) (0.005)
0.032 0.032 -0.012 0.017 0.006
(0.050) (0.039) (0.032) (0.017) (0.007)
-0.017 -0.012 -0.011 -0.007 0.003
(0.025) (0.021) (0.015) (0.010) (0.003)
-0.076* -0.022 -0.024 0.004 -0.008
(0.042) (0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.006)
0.133 0.144 0.028 -0.019 0.018
(0.124) (0.099) (0.051) (0.043) (0.019)
-0.030 -0.069 0.007 -0.017 0.005
(0.038) (0.042) (0.022) (0.025) (0.007)
-0.004 0.045 0.020 -0.014 -0.001
(0.064) (0.056) (0.034) (0.027) (0.009)
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Treated x Far-away period dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Industry group dummies in interactions YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Case FE YES YES YES YES YES
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO
Firm-year-level characteristics NO NO NO NO NO
Number of observations 1,052,303 1,034,647 955,048 964,780 969,656
Treated x After(4-5) x LocalServices
Treated x After(4-5) x Competitor
Treated x After(4-5) x Supplier
Treated x After(4-5) x Buyer
Sample: firms within a 10 km radius agglomeration, with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very large firms, firms with a closing 
plant and foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. Multiple control cities are used, weighted by the distance of propensity score estimates 
from the treated propensity scores. LocalServices indicate to firms providing local services. Buyer and Supplier indicate firms operating in the buyer 
or supplier industries of the closing plant. Competitor indicates firms operating in the same industry as the closing plant. The other right-hand side 
variables are also interacted with the industry group dummies. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km agglomeration of the 
closing plant. I include four separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period is [t-
6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more 
than 5 years after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time 
period dummies interacted with the Treated dummy. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also 
included. Firm-year-level characteristics include log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter status. 
The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I 
show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(1-3) x LocalServices
Treated x After(1-3) x Competitor
Treated x After(1-3) x Supplier
Treated x After(1-3) x Buyer
Treated x After(4-5)
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Table A28: Baseline estimates in the 10-20 km agglomeration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
log sales log empl
log labor 
productivity
log per 
capita wage
log TFP exit 
0.005 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.000
(0.019) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
0.023 0.005 0.007 -0.001 -0.008 -0.003
(0.024) (0.015) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003)
Number of observations 368,143 361,951 332,611 337,580 359,457 337,697
Number of unique firms 21,298 21,375 20,866 21,050 21,349
0.029 0.017 0.013 -0.003 0.005 -0.002
(0.022) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
0.043 0.023 0.015 -0.007 0.000 -0.005
(0.032) (0.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004)
-0.037 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 0.004 0.002
(0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.016) (0.009) (0.006)
-0.125 -0.126* -0.030 0.035 -0.077** -0.015
(0.087) (0.065) (0.060) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017)
-0.039 0.002 -0.052* 0.013 -0.033* 0.003
(0.042) (0.040) (0.028) (0.021) (0.017) (0.007)
-0.054 -0.042 0.031 -0.003 -0.003 0.013
(0.057) (0.049) (0.042) (0.022) (0.018) (0.009)
-0.054 -0.051 0.006 -0.001 0.010 0.003
(0.051) (0.034) (0.034) (0.018) (0.014) (0.007)
0.030 -0.180 0.071 0.028 -0.060 -0.007
(0.171) (0.120) (0.077) (0.047) (0.046) (0.019)
-0.026 0.018 -0.050 0.023 -0.043 0.010
(0.061) (0.053) (0.042) (0.028) (0.032) (0.009)
-0.004 -0.024 0.050 0.019 0.001 -0.004
(0.089) (0.079) (0.076) (0.026) (0.030) (0.011)
Number of observations 368,143 361,951 332,611 337,580 359,457 337,697
Number of unique firms 21,298 21,375 20,866 21,050 21,349
Sample: firms within a 10-20 km radius agglomeration (excluding the 10 km radius agglomeration), with a median level of employment of at least 5, excluding very 
large firms, firms with a closing plant and foreing-owned large firms in the control locations. LocalServices indicate to firms providing local services. Buyer and 
Supplier indicate firms operating in the buyer or supplier industries of the closing plant. Competitor indicates firms operating in the same industry as the closing 
plant. The other right-hand side variables are also interacted with the industry group dummies. Treated is an indicator of firms being located in the 10 km 
agglomeration of the closing plant. I include four separate time period dummies: After(1-3), After(4-5) and two Far-away period dummies. The baseline time period 
is [t-6,t], where t denotes the year of the plant closure. Far-away periods refer to separate dummies for the period more than 6 years before and more than 5 years 
after the closure. After(1-3) denotes the period [t+1,t+3] and After(4-5) denotes the period [t+4,t+5]. I also include Far-away time period dummies interacted with 
the Treated dummy. Fixed effects for firm (or 2-digit industry instead in column (6), case and calendar year are also included. Firm-year-level characteristics include 
log employment, age, log capital/labor ratio, log per capita wage, log TFP and yearly exporter status. The unit of observation is firm-year-case. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. In columns (1)-(4) standard errors are clustered by city, in cloumn (5) I show bootstrap standard errors and in column (6) standard errors are 
clustered by firm. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Treated x After(1-3) x Supplier
Treated x After(1-3) x Buyer
Treated x After(4-5) x LocalServices
Treated x After(4-5) x Competitor
Treated x After(4-5) x Supplier
Treated x After(4-5) x Buyer
Treated x After(1-3) x Competitor
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
Treated x After(1-3)
Treated x After(4-5)
Treated x After(1-3) x LocalServices
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